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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Congress introduced the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to make use of new 
technologies and to enable the intelligence community to obtain information vital to U.S. 
	   2 
national security, while preventing the National Security Agency and other federal 
intelligence-gathering entities from engaging in broad domestic surveillance.  The 
legislature sought to prevent a recurrence of the abuses of the 1960s and 1970s that 
accompanied the Cold War and the rapid expansion in communications technologies. 
Congress purposefully circumscribed the NSA’s authorities by limiting them to 
foreign intelligence gathering.  It required that the target be a foreign power or an agent 
thereof, insisted that such claims be supported by probable cause, and heightened the 
protections afforded to the domestic collection of U.S. citizens’ information.  Initially 
focused on electronic surveillance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act gradually 
expanded over time to incorporate physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace, and 
business records and tangible goods.  The addition of these provisions took place within 
the same general framing that Congress had adopted in enacting the legislation in the first 
place. 
Documents related to the recently revealed telephony metadata program, conducted 
under the auspices of the Foreign Intelligence Act and its subsequent amendments, 
suggests that the National Security Agency is now interpreting the statutory provisions in 
a manner directly contrary to Congress’ intent.  It reflects neither the particularization 
required by Congress prior to acquisition of information, nor the role anticipated by 
Congress for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review.  
The specific legal reasoning offered in defense of the program, moreover, violates the 
statutory language in three important ways:  (a) it contradicts the requirement the records 
sought “are relevant to an authorized investigation”; (b) it violates the statutory provision 
that requires that information sought could be obtained via subpoena duces tecum; and 
(c) it bypasses the statutory framing for pen registers and trap and trace devices.  In 
addition, the program raises serious constitutional concerns. The FISC order amounts to a 
general warrant, which the Fourth Amendment is designed to preclude. Efforts by the 
government to save the program on grounds of third party doctrine are similarly 
unpersuasive in light of the unique circumstances of Smith v. Maryland, new 
technologies, and changed circumstances. An end to the telephony metadata program and 
FISA reform are necessary to bring surveillance operations and emerging technologies 
within the bounds of the Constitution. 
 
II.  ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 
 
In the early 1970s, a series of news stories broke detailing the existence of covert 
domestic surveillance programs directed at U.S. citizens.  These revelations led, inter 
alia, to the creation of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities.  Chaired by Senator Frank Church, the Committee 
uncovered a range of deeply concerning domestic surveillance operations, prompting 
Congress to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
 
A.  Initial Revelations 
One of the first public indications that the executive branch was engaging in broad 
domestic intelligence gathering came in January 1970.  Writing in the Washington 
Monthly, Christopher Pyle charged that the Army was engaged in the surveillance of 
American citizens.1  The following year, an organization calling itself the Citizens’ 
Commission to Investigate the FBI broke into a two-person FBI office in Media, 
Pennsylvania, stealing 1000 classified documents, all of which WIN Magazine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence:  The Army Watches Civilian Politics, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 
Jan. 1, 1970, at 4, reproduced in 91 CONG. REC. 2227-2231 (1970).  
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subsequently published.2  A code word on these documents, “COINTELPRO”, (for 
“counterintelligence program”), prompted Carl Stern, a reporter for NBC, to initiate a 
Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.3  On December 6, 1973, Stern filed a story that ran 
on the NBC Nightly News, detailing extensive domestic surveillance and disruption 
undertaken by the FBI for national security purposes.4 
Following these initial disclosures, in 1974 Seymour M. Hersh, an investigative 
reporter, published a detailed report in the New York Times that immediately captured 
public attention.  The article stated that during the Nixon Administration the Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) had conducted a massive intelligence operation “against the 
antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States.”5  Intelligence files on 
more than 10,000 Americans – including members of Congress – had been maintained by 
a special unit that reported directly to the Director of Central Intelligence.6  The CIA had 
also engaged in dozens of other illegal operations since the 1950s, such as “break-ins, 
wiretapping, and the surreptitious inspection of mail.”7 One official reported that the 
requirement to keep files on U.S. citizens stemmed, in part, from the so-called Huston 
plan.8 Agency officials claimed at the time that although directed at U.S. citizens, 
everything they had done had been under the auspices of foreign intelligence gathering.9   
These new revelations came as quite a surprise, not least because the 1947 National 
Security Act forbade the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from having any 
“police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions.”10  The report, 
moreover, came on the heels of a Senate Armed Services Committee report condemning 
the Pentagon for spying on the White House National Security Council. 
These public allegations, related to intelligence agencies’ impropriety, illegal 
activities, and abuses of authority, prompted both Houses of Congress to create 
temporary committees to investigate the accusations:  the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities.11 
The latter, Chaired by Senator Frank F. Church (D-ID), with the assistance of Senator 
John G. Tower (R-TX) as Vice Chairman, was a carefully-constructed, bipartisan 
initiative.  Its membership included eleven Senators, six drawn from the majority party 
and five from the minority party.12 The Republican leadership in the Senate chose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Complete Collection of Political Documents Ripped-off from the FBI Office in Media PA, March 8, 
1971, WIN MAG., Mar. 1972. Note that the original FBI files are now located at the Swarthmore College 
Peace Collection, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.  
3 Memorandum from C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan (Apr. 27, 1971); Letter from FBI headquarters to All 
SAC’s (Apr. 28, 1971), cited in SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND 
THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL 
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP NO. 94-755, at 3 (1976) available at 
http://archive.org/stream/finalreportofsel03unit#page/n3/mode/2up. 
4 91 CONG. REC. 26,329 (1970).  
5 Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in 
Nixon Years, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at 1. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 26.  Named for Tom Charles Huston, the Presidential aide who conceived the project, the plan called 
for the use of burglaries and wiretapping to counter antiwar activities and student turmoil ostensibly 
“fomented” by black extremists. President Nixon and senior officials claimed that it had never been 
implemented. 
9 Id. at 26. 
10 National Security Act of 1947 § 104A(d)(1) (2013).  
11 H.R. Res. 138, 94th Cong. (1975); replaced and expanded by H.R. Res. 591, 94th Cong. (1975); S. Res. 
21, 94th Cong. (1975). 
12 Intelligence Activities: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States, 94th Cong. ii (1975). 
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legislators representing a range of views within their party, as did the Democratic 
leadership.13 Further thought was given to diversity of experience, incorporating both 
senior members of the Senate, as well as some of the most junior members—including 
one Senator, who had only begun his service a few weeks prior to the formation of the 
committee.14  The Senate overwhelmingly supported the establishment of the Select 
Committee, endorsing its creation by a vote of 82-4.15 
The Senate directed the committee to do two things:  first, to investigate “illegal, 
improper, or unethical activities” in which the intelligence agencies engaged; and, 
second, to determine the “need for specific legislative authority to govern” the NSA and 
other agencies.16  The Church Committee subsequently took testimony from hundreds of 
people, inside and outside of government, in public and private hearings.  The NSA, FBI, 
CIA, IRS, Post Office, and other federal agencies submitted documents.  In 1975 and 
1976 the Committee issued seven reports and 6 supplemental volumes, classifying 
another 60 reports for future release.17 
The committee found that broad domestic surveillance programs, conducted under 
the guise of foreign intelligence collection, had undermined the privacy rights of U.S. 
citizens.18  The NSA figured largely in these concerns. 
 
B.   NSA Domestic Surveillance 
Although the NSA maintained a definition of foreign intelligence that focused on threats 
external to the United States, a key contributor to the agency’s decision to intercept 
Americans’ communications was the question of whether the definition of foreign 
communications prevented the acquisition, or merely the analysis, of information not 
related to foreign intelligence. The NSA adopted—and the Church committee rejected—
the latter approach. 
In October 1952, President Truman issued a classified memo that laid out the future 
of U.S. signals intelligence and created the NSA.19 Truman’s aim was to (a) strengthen 
U.S. signals intelligence capabilities, (b) support the country’s ability to wage war, and 
(c) generate information central to the conduct of foreign affairs.20  The NSA’s mission, 
accordingly, was to obtain foreign intelligence from foreign electrical communications.21   
From the beginning, the agency understood foreign intelligence to involve the 
interception of communications wholly or partly outside the United States and not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Interviews with Senator Walter Mondale and Senator Gary Hart, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 23, 2013). 
14 Id. 
15 121 CONG. REC. 1416-34 (1975). 
16 S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975). 
17 Interview with Senator Gary Hart, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 2013).  Since 1992, another 50,000 pages 
of the records have been declassified and made publicly available at the National Archives.  History Matters, 
Rockefeller Commission Report, available at http://history-
matters.com/archive/contents/church/contents_church_reports_rockcomm.htm; Press Release, National Security Agency Central 
Security Service, The National Security Agency Releases Over 50,000 Pages of Declassified Documents 
(June 8, 2011), http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_ room/2011/50000_declassified_docs.shtml.. 
18 Intelligence Activities: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States, 94th Cong. vol. 1-7 (1975).   
19 Presidential Memorandum, Oct. 29, 1952, amending National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 
9, Mar. 10, 1950 (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of 
State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 195). 
20 5 Intelligence Activities: Hearings on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Comm. to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States, 94th Cong. 9 (1975) (hereinafter 
Church Committee Report, Vol. 5).  For an informative discussion of MI-8 and the NSA’s predecessor 
agencies, see HOUSE COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, INTERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (DRAFT REPORT) 1-12, available at 
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=145022&relPageId=14. 
21 Id. at 6 (statement of General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency). 
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targeted at U.S. persons. Neither the Presidential directive of 1952, nor the National 
Security Council Intelligence Directive (“NSCID”) No. 6, which authorized the CIA to 
engage in Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring, defined the term “foreign 
communications.” 22 
NSCID 9, however, entitled Communications Intelligence, defined “foreign 
communications” as “all communications and related materials . . . of the government 
and/or their nationals or of any military, air, or naval force, faction, party, department, 
agency, or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting 
to act therefor.”  It included “all other telecommunications and related material of, to, and 
from a foreign country which may contain information of military, political, scientific or 
economic value.”23  “Foreign communications” thus turned upon the nature of the entity 
engaged in communications:  i.e., a foreign power, or an individual acting on behalf of a 
foreign power. 
The NSA did not (indeed, could not) discuss NSCID 9 during the Church 
Committee’s public hearings.  However, the Director of Central Intelligence had issued a 
directive that the NSA did discuss, which employed a definition of foreign 
communications that excluded communications between U.S. citizens or entities.24 In 
keeping with these understandings, the NSA ostensibly focused on communications 
conducted wholly or partly outside the United States and not targeted at U.S. persons. 
The distinction was drawn, however, at the point of analysis—not the point of 
communication. 
Testifying in 1975 before the Church Committee, NSA Director Lieutenant General 
Lew Allen, Jr. could thus assert that the NSA did not at that time, nor had it (with one 
exception—i.e., individuals whose names were contained on the NSA’s watch list) 
“conducted intercept operations for the purpose of obtaining the communications of U.S. 
citizens.”25 Whether such communications were incidentally intercepted, however, was 
another matter: “some circuits which are known to carry foreign communications 
necessary for foreign intelligence will also carry personal communications between U.S. 
citizens, one of whom is at a foreign location.”26 
Central to Allen’s assertion was the understanding that, to constitute foreign 
communications, and to legitimate the collection of information on U.S. citizens, the 
target of the surveillance must be a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign power, and at 
least one party to the communications must be outside the country.   
Importantly, the Senate considered this approach, in light of the broad swathes of 
information obtained about U.S. citizens, to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  Two 
NSA programs, in particular, generated significant concern. The first, Project MINARET, 
introduced to collect foreign intelligence information, ended up intercepting hundreds of 
U.S. citizens’ communications.  The second, Operation SHAMROCK, involved the 
large-scale collection of U.S. citizens’ communications from Private Companies. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 NSCID No. 6 (Dec. 12, 1947) (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lott 66 D 148, Dulles-Jackson-Correa 
Report, Annex 12); see also Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 6. 
23 NSCID No. 9 (Jul. 1, 1948) (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 195); see also NSCID No. 9, 
Mar. 10, 1950, supra.   
24 Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 9. 
25 Id.   
26 Id. 
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1. Project MINARET 
In the late 1960s, the NSA, like the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the FBI, and the 
CIA, constructed a list of U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens subject to surveillance.27 
The program, which operated 1967-1973, started out by narrowly focusing on the 
international communications of U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba.  It quickly expanded, 
however, to include individuals (a) involved in civil disturbances, (b) suspected of 
criminal activity, (c) implicated in drug activity, (d) of concern to those tasked with 
Presidential protection, and (e) suspected of involvement in international terrorism.28 
In 1969 the collection of information on individuals included in the watch list became 
known as Project MINARET.29 When details about the program emerged, senators and 
members of the public expressed alarm about the privacy implications. Central to the 
legislators’ concern was the potential for such programs to target communications of a 
wholly domestic nature. Senator (later Vice President) Walter Mondale, articulated the 
Committee’s disquiet: 
Given another day and another President, another perceived risk and someone 
breathing hot down the neck of the military leader then in charge of the NSA:  
demanding a review based on another watch list, another wide sweep to 
determine whether some of the domestic dissent is really foreign based, my 
concern is whether that pressure could be resisted on the basis of the law or not . . 
. [W]hat we have to deal with is whether this incredibly powerful and impressive 
institution . . . could be used by President ‘A’ in the future to spy upon the 
American people. . . [W]e need to . . . very carefully define the law, spell it out so 
that it is clear what [the Director of the NSA’s authority is and is not].30  
Senator Mondale asked NSA Director General Lew Allen whether he would object to a 
new law clarifying that the NSA did not have the authority to collect domestic 
information on U.S. citizens.  Allen indicated that he did not object.31  FISA became the 
instrument designed to limit the NSA’s collection of information on U.S. citizens. 
 
2.  Operation SHAMROCK 
During the Senate hearings, much concern was expressed about whether to make public a 
second, highly classified, large-scale surveillance program run by the NSA. 32  The 
committee decided to discuss the program in open session on the grounds that it was both 
illegal and violated the Fourth Amendment.33 
Operation SHAMROCK was the cover name given to a program in which the 
government had convinced three major telegraph companies (RCA Global, ITT World 
Communications, and Western Union International) to forward international telegraphic 
traffic to the Department of Defense. 34  For nearly thirty years, the NSA and its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 3.   
28 Id. at 10-11. 
29 Id. at 30.   
30 Id. at 36. 
31 Id. at 36. 
32 Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 48-57, 60-61, 63; see also HOUSE COMM. ON GOV’T 
OPERATIONS, INTERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
(DRAFT REPORT) 2-6, available at 
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=145022&relPageId=4 (discussing 
pressures on the Church Committee from the House side). 
33 Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 57 (statement of Senator Frank Church, Chairman, Select 
Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States of the 
United States Senate). 
34 Id. at 57-58.   
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predecessors received copies of most international telegrams that had originated in, or 
been forwarded through, the United States.35 
Operation SHAMROCK stemmed from wartime measures, in which companies 
turned messages related to foreign intelligence targets over to military intelligence.  In 
1947, the Department of Defense negotiated the continuation of the program in return for 
protecting the companies from criminal liability and public exposure.36 
Like Project MINARET, the scope of the program gradually expanded.  Initially, the 
program focused on foreign targets.  Eventually, however, as new technologies became 
available, the NSA began extracting U.S. citizens’ communications. 37  It selected 
approximately 150,000 messages per month for further analysis, distributing some 
messages to other agencies.38 
Senators expressed strong concern at the resulting privacy violations, inviting the 
Attorney General before the Select Committee to discuss “the Fourth Amendment of the 
constitution and its application to the 20th century problems of intelligence and 
surveillance.”39 Senator Frank Church explained: 
In the case of the NSA, which is of particular concern to us today, the rapid 
development of technology in the area of electronic surveillance has seriously 
aggravated present ambiguities in the law.  The broad sweep of communications 
interception by NSA takes us far beyond the previous fourth amendment 
controversies where particular individuals and specific telephone lines were the 
target.40 
General Lew Allen sought to reassure the committee that although some circuits carried 
personal communications, the interception was “conducted in such a manner as to 
minimize the unwanted messages.”  Nevertheless, the agency might obtain many 
unwanted communications; it thus undertook procedures to process, sort, and analyze the 
relevant data. “The analysis and reporting is accomplished only for those messages which 
meet specified conditions and requirements for foreign intelligence.”41  Elaborating 
further, Allen noted, “[t]he use of lists of words, including individual names, subjects, 
locations, etc., has long been one of the methods used to sort out information of foreign 
intelligence value from that which is not of interest.”42 
The question that confronted Congress was how to limit the NSA’s ability to acquire 
broad swathes of information up front, in the process obtaining access to private 
communications of individuals with no connection to foreign intelligence concerns.  
Congress would have to find a way to control new, sophisticated technologies, to allow 
intelligence agencies to perform their legitimate foreign intelligence activities, without 
also allowing them to invade U.S. citizens’ privacy by allowing them access to 
information unrelated to national security.43   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Id. at 58. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 58-59.   
38 Id. at 60. 
39 Id. at 65.   
40 Id. 
41 Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 19. Former CIA Director William E. Colby provided similar 
testimony before the Pike Committee August 6, 1975:  “On some occasions, (the interception of U.S. 
citizens’ communications) cannot be separated from the traffic that is being monitored.  It is technologically 
impossible to separate them.” U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Intelligence Costs and Fiscal 
Procedures: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives, 94th 
Cong. 241 (statement of  William E. Colby, acting Director of CIA). 
42 Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 20. 
43 Id. 
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In the absence of any governing statute, Attorney General Edward H. Levi’s 
approach had been to authorize the requested surveillance only where a clear nexus 
existed between the target and a foreign power.44 The Attorney General sought to 
distinguish the process from the British Crown’s use of writs of assistance, in the shadow 
of which James Madison had drafted the Fourth Amendment.45  The Founders’ objection 
to such instruments was simple:  were the government to be granted the authority to 
break into and to search individuals’ homes without cause, the private affairs of every 
person would be subject to inspection.46  In contrast, Levi argued, the exercise of 
electronic wiretaps for foreign intelligence gathering fell subject to Attorney General 
review.  Nevertheless, he recognized the need for new laws to address the ambiguity that 
attended the use of modern technologies.  The Senators agreed.47 
 
C.  Broader Context  
The NSA was not the only federal entity making use of new technologies to collect 
significant amounts of information on U.S. citizens.  The FBI, CIA, IRS, U.S. Army, and 
other federal entities similarly engaged in broad, domestic intelligence-gathering 
operations.  Details relating to many of these programs, such as the FBI’s COINTELPRO 
and the CIA’s Operation CHAOS, were uncovered by both the exhaustive investigations 
of Senate Select Committee and other entities stood up to consider the range and extent 
of programs underway. 48  Both statutory violations and constitutional concerns 
accompanied these inquiries. 
In 1970, for instance, Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC), began investigating the public 
allegations.  After a year of making minimal progress in the face of misleading 
statements from the Nixon Administration, claims of inherent Executive power, and the 
refusal to disclose information that might damage national security, in 1971 Senator 
Ervin called for public hearings to consider “the dangers the Army’s program presents to 
the principles of the Constitution.”49 
In 1975 President Ford issued an executive order establishing the President’s 
Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (“Rockefeller Commission”).50 
Ford appointed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as Chair.51 The public charges to 
which the Rockefeller Commission responded included large-scale domestic surveillance 
of U.S. citizens; retaining dossiers on U.S. citizens; and aiming such collection efforts at 
individuals who disagreed with government policies.52  The Commission’s aim was 
further supplemented by allegations that for the past twenty years the CIA had (a) 
intercepted and opened personal mail in the United States; (b) infiltrated domestic 
dissident groups and intervened in domestic politics; (c) engaged in illegal wiretaps and 
break-ins; and (d) improperly assisted other government agencies.53  
Like the Senate Select Committee, a key question confronting the Rockefeller 
Commission was how to define the term “foreign intelligence”—a crucial step in 
protecting Americans’ right to privacy.  Accordingly, in its first recommendation, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Id. at 71.   
45 Id. at 71-72.   
46 Id. at 72. 
47 See, e.g., id. at 64-65, 84, 125. 
48 See, e.g., Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 6.  
49 91 CONG. REC. 26,329. 
50 Exec. Order No. 11,828, 3 C.F.R. 933 (1975).   
51 Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States: Announcement of Appointment of Chairman and 
Members, 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 25 (Jan. 5, 1975).   
52 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 9 (June 
1975).   
53 Id. 
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Rockefeller Commission advised that Section 403 of the 1947 National Security Act be 
amended to make it explicit that the CIA’s activities solely related to “foreign 
intelligence.”54 Any involvement of U.S. citizens could only be incidental to foreign 
intelligence collection.55 
The Commission reinforced the strict separation between foreign targets and U.S. 
persons through its second recommendation: that the President, via Executive Order, 
“prohibit the CIA from the collection of information about the domestic activities of 
United States citizens (whether by overt or covert means), the evaluation, correlation, and 
dissemination of analyses or reports about such activities, and the storage of such 
information.” 56 
The House Select Intelligence Committee, in turn, created on February 19, 1975 
(known as the Nedzi Committee, after its chair, Lucien Nedzi, Chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee at the time), was replaced five months later by a committee headed 
by Representative Otis Pike (D-NY).57  The Pike Committee focused on a range of 
intelligence agency intelligence gathering programs—including those of the National 
Security Agency.58  Public hearings on the agency’s operations were held in October 
1975 and February and March 1976.59  Its draft report complained of the tension between 
Congress and the Executive branch, noting the “intense Executive branch efforts” to have 
the NSA hearings curtailed or postponed—both in the Senate and the House.60   
Like the Church Committee, the Pike Committee expressed concern about 
SHAMROCK and MINARET, noting that the former resulted in the NSA maintaining 
files on approximately 75,000 American Citizens between 1952 and 1974:  
Persons included in these files included civil rights leaders, antiwar activists, and 
Members of Congress.  For at least 13 years, CIA employees were given 
unrestricted access to these files, and one or more worked full time retrieving 
information that presumably was contributed to the CIA’s domestic intelligence 
program – Operation CHAOS – which existed from 1967 to 1974.61 
For the Pike Committee, these programs violated both Section 605 of the 
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment.62   
The committee expressed particular concern about the NSA’s “vacuum cleaner” 
approach to foreign intelligence gathering.63  The committee noted that some 24 million 
telegrams and 50 million telex (teletype) messages entered, left, and transited the United 
States each year; millions of additional messages traveled over leased lines, “Including 
millions of computer data transmissions electronically entering and leaving the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Id. at 12.   
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 15. 
57 H.R. Res. 138, 94th Cong. (Feb. 19, 1975) (introduced Jan. 16, 1975 and passed Feb. 19, 1975 by a vote of 
286-120).  
58 See, e.g., U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities; Intelligence Costs and Fiscal Procedures: Hearings 
Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. Pt. 1 (1975), printed for the Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, 58-920 (1975);  U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities:  Domestic Intelligence Programs: 
Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong., Pt. 3 (1975), printed for the Select Committee 
on Intelligence, 53-165 (1976); U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities:  Committee Proceedings-
Proceedings of the Select Committee on Intelligence, 94th Cong. Pt. 4 (1975), printed for the Select Comm. 
on Intelligence, 63-746 (1976). 
59 HOUSE COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, INTERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS BY THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (DRAFT REPORT) 2, available at 
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=145022&relPageId=4. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 14. 
62 Id. at 15-17. 
63 Id. at 18. 
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country”—and international telephone calls presented yet further potential sources of 
intelligence.64  
Coming on the heels of the Pentagon Papers (demonstrating that the Johnson 
Administration had systematically lied to the public and to Congress), the Watergate 
scandal (in which the Nixon Administration orchestrated a June 1972 break-in at the 
Democratic National Committee Headquarters), and President Nixon’s resignation on 
August 9, 1974, the existence of programs investigated by the Church Committee, the 
Rockefeller Commission, the Pike Committee, and others fed into and deepened the 
erosion of public confidence in the executive branch. More specifically, their findings 
undermined citizens’ confidence in the intelligence agencies.65 A critical question facing 
Congress was how to rebuild confidence in the system, how to incorporate new 
technologies into the existing infrastructure, and how to empower the intelligence 
agencies to conduct electronic surveillance, while protecting the privacy rights of U.S. 
citizens. 
A timely judicial decision helped to lay the groundwork for Congressional action. In 
1972 the Supreme Court had held that the electronic surveillance of domestic groups, 
even where security issues might be involved, required that the government first obtain a 
warrant.  The “inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept”, and the significant 
possibility that it could be abused to quash political dissent, underscored the importance 
of the Fourth Amendment—particularly when the government was engaged in spying on 
its own citizens.66 
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, emphasized the limits on the scope of the 
decision:  “[T]his case involves only the domestic aspects of national security.  We have 
not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with 
respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.” 67  Different standards and 
procedures might apply to domestic security surveillance than those required by Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.68 The Court issued an 
invitation to Congress to pass new laws covering such cases.69 
Four critical changes followed.  First, consistent with the Church Committee’s 
recommendations, Congress created a permanent Senate Intelligence Committee.  Indeed, 
within a month of the final report, a resolution to this effect was introduced, and on May 
19, 1976 it passed by overwhelming majority, 72-22. 70   The new Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”) was provided exclusive oversight of the CIA and 
concurrent jurisdiction over the NSA and other elements of the Intelligence Community 
(“IC”).  The resolution directed that the IC keep the new entity “fully and currently 
informed” of their activities, including all “significant anticipated activities.”  It was to be 
a “select”, rather than a “standing” committee, precisely to allow the Senate majority and 
minority leaders to decide its composition – and to avoid the same in the party caucuses 
preceding each new Congress.  The Chair and Vice Chair would not be allowed to serve 
concurrently as Chair or ranking minority member of any major standing committee. 
Of the 15 members selected, no more than 8 would be drawn from the majority party, 
ensuring balance between the parties.  In addition, composition would be built to ensure 
cross-representation in related committees:  two members had to sit each on 
Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary.  A limit of eight years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Id. 
65 124 CONG. REC. 36,415 (1978).   
66 United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).  
67 Id. at 321-322.   
68 Id. at 322.   
69 Id. at 323. 
70 S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976). 
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was placed on committee membership, to avoid intelligence agency capture.  Notably, 
five of the first 15 members (Walter Huddleston (D-KY), Gary Hart (D-CO), Robert 
Morgan (D-NC), Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), and Howard Baker (R-TN), had served as 
members of the Church Committee—while 14 members of SSCI’s staff had served as 
staff members to the same, including William Miller, the staff director for both the 
Church Committee and the newly-minted SSCI.71  
Second, the President issued an Executive Order, “to improve the quality of 
intelligence needed for national security, to clarify the authority and responsibilities of 
the intelligence departments and agencies, and to establish effective oversight to assure 
compliance with law in the management and direction of intelligence agencies and 
departments of the national government.”72   
Executive Order 11905 prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency from engaging in 
electronic surveillance in the United States and banned intelligence agencies from 
engaging in physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, unconsented physical searches, 
mail opening, or examining federal tax returns except as consistent with procedures 
approved by the Attorney General or in accordance with applicable statutes and 
regulations.73  It prohibited the infiltration of organizations for the purpose of reporting 
on their activities, unless the organization was primarily composed of Non-US persons 
and reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.74   Importantly, the 
order prevented any collection of information about U.S. persons’ domestic activities 
absent situations with clear foreign intelligence or counterintelligence component.75  
Despite the provisions contained in the Executive Order, Congress considered 
legislative action to be crucial to reigning in the intelligence agencies.  Resultantly, as a 
third outcome, Congress re-wrote the National Security Act to require a finding and 
notification for covert action.   
Fourth, and most germane to the Judiciary Committee hearing today, Congress 
passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  The aim was to empower the 
intelligence agencies to collect information necessary to protect U.S. national security, 
while simultaneously preventing agencies from using foreign intelligence gathering as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Discussion with William Miller, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 2013).  For discussion of the history of the 
founding of this committee and its subsequent development, see LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES:  THE U.S. EXPERIENCE, Report, Prepared by the Select Comm. on Intelligence of the United States 
Senate, 103rd Cong. (1994).  See also FRANK J. SMIST, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1947-1989 (1990); L. BRITT SNIDER, THE AGENCY & THE HILL:  CIA’S 
RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS, 1946-2004, at 51-91(2008).  Following the rather dismal mood that marked 
the Pike Committee’s operations, the House Permanent Select committee on Intelligence was not founded 
until July 17, 1977.  At that point, House Resolution 658 passed 227-171, creating the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).  The structure of both committees remained relatively constant until 
2004. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States issued its report in July 2004, 
criticizing the system of congressional oversight of intelligence agencies as “dysfunctional” and 
recommending either a joint committee on intelligence (similar to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee), with 
authority both the authorize and appropriate, smaller committees, and the elimination of term limits.  U.S. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT:  
FINAL REPORT 420-21 (2004).  (NB:  the first proposal to create a joint committee on intelligence was 
actually made in 1948.  See H. Con. Res. 186, 80th Cong. (1948) (introduced by Rep. Devitt).  In 2004, the 
Senate eliminated the eight-year term limits, elevated the committee to category A (Senators are generally 
only able to serve on up to two “A” Committees), created an Oversight Subcommittee, and created an 
Intelligence Subcommittee in the Appropriations Committee. S. Res. 445, 108th Cong. (2004).  
72 Exec. Order No. 11905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976). This order was subsequently 
altered/strengthened by Exec. Order No. 12036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (Jan. 24, 1978) and replaced in part by 
Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981).  
73 Exec. Order No. 11905, § 5(b)(1)-(5), 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976). 
74 Id. § 5(b)(6). 
75 Id. § 5(b)(7). 
	   12 
excuse for engaging in domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens.  The process began with 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, the first bill introduced into Congress, 
and supported by the President and Attorney General, that would require judicial 
warrants in foreign intelligence cases.76 Its successor bill, S.1566, became the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.77 
 
III.  CONTOURS OF FISA 
 
From the beginning, Congressional members made it clear that the legislation was 
designed to prevent precisely the types of broad surveillance programs and incursions 
into privacy represented by Project MINARET, Operation SHAMROCK, 
COINTELPRO, Operation CHAOS, and other intelligence-gathering initiatives that had 
come to light.   
During consideration of the Conference Report on S. 1566, for instance, Senator Ted 
Kennedy (D-MA) noted, “The abuses of recent history sanctioned in the name of national 
security highlighted the need for this legislation.”78 The debate represented the “final 
chapter in the ongoing 10-year debate to regulate foreign intelligence electronic 
surveillance.”79 With the passage of FISA, the Senate would “at long last place foreign 
intelligence electronic surveillance under the rule of law.”80 Senator Birch Bayh, Jr. (D-
IN) echoed Kennedy’s sentiments, “This bill, for the first time in history, protects the 
rights of individuals from government activities in the foreign intelligence area.”81 
Senator Charles Mathais (R-MD) noted that enactment of the legislation would be a 
milestone, ensuring “that electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence cases will be 
conducted in conformity with the principles set forth in the fourth amendment.”82 
Congress purposefully circumscribed the NSA’s authorities in the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act by adopting four key protections.  First, any information 
obtained from an electronic intercept had to be tied to a specific person or entity, 
identified as a foreign power or an agent thereof, prior to the collection of the 
information.  Second, the government had to demonstrate probable cause that the target, 
about whom information was to be collected, was a foreign power or an agent thereof.  
For U.S. persons, such probable cause could not be established solely on the basis of 
otherwise protected First Amendment activities, thus providing American citizens with a 
higher level of protection.  Third, Congress adopted minimization procedures to restrict 
the type of information that could be obtained and retained.   Fourth, FISA made 
provision for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) to oversee the process.  
Designed to introduce a neutral, disinterested magistrate into the equation, FISC’s role 
was, narrowly, to ascertain whether the government had met the appropriate requirements 
for targeting prior to the acquisition of information.  All of these limits dealt, specifically, 
with electronic communications.  Over time, the statute expanded to apply a similar 
approach to physical searches, the placement of pen registers and trap and trace, and 
business records—as well as tangible goods. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong 
(1976).   
77 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, S. 1566, 95th Cong 
(1978). 
78 124 CONG. REC. 34,845 (1978).    
79 Id.   
80 Id.   
81 Id.   
82 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978) (statement of Senator Mathais). 
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A.  Acquisition of Information Tied to Entity Targeted Prior to Collection 
From the outset, Congress sought to limit the amount of information acquired by the NSC 
and others by requiring that the target of surveillance be a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power prior to orders being issued to intercept communications. FISA defined a 
“foreign power” as: 
(1)  a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized 
by the United States; 
(2)  a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United 
States persons; 
(3)  an entity that is openly acknowlwedged by a foreign government or 
governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or 
governments; 
(4)  a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation 
therefor; 
(5)  a foreign-based political organizations, not substantially composed of United 
States persons; or 
(6)  an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or 
governments.83 
Prior to passage of the bill, the Senate defined “foreign power”, with regard to 
terrorist groups, to mean a foreign-based entity.  The House amendments, in contrast, 
understood “foreign power” to include groups engaged in international terrorism or 
activities in preparation therefor.  In the end, the Conference adopted the House 
definition, with the idea that limiting such surveillance solely to foreign-based groups 
would be unnecessarily burdensome.84   
Regardless, however, of whether the target was a foreign power (in the strict sense), 
or a group engaged in international terrorism, in both Houses, throughout the nuanced 
discussion, underlying the definition of “foreign power” was the understanding that prior 
to collection of information, the government would have to establish that the target—in 
relation to whom such information would be obtained—qualified as a foreign power or 
an agent thereof.85 
In focusing thus on the targets of the communications, Congress rejected the NSA’s 
previous (and now current) reading of what constituted a “target” in relation to data 
collection.86  That is, the information to be obtained, at the moment of acquisition (not in 
the context of subsequent analysis—the position advocated by General Allen during the 
Church Committee hearings and recently resurrected by the NSA), had to relate directly 
to the individual or entity believed to be a foreign power or an agent thereof.   
 
B.  Probable Cause and Satisfaction of Criminal Standards Prior to Collection 
A second protection stemmed from concerns evinced in the Senate about how to 
determine whether the (specific) target was a “foreign power” or “an agent thereof”.  
Uppermost in legislators’ minds was the need to provide heightened protections for 
targets of surveillance generally and U.S. citizens in particular.  The final bill 
accomplished this in two ways: adoption of a standard of probable cause and, under 
certain circumstances, the requirement of a showing of criminal wrongdoing, in order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 50 U.S.C. §1801(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
84 124 CONG. REC. 33,782 (1978); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
85 124 CONG. REC. 33,782 (1978).   
86 Testimony of General Lew Allen, Jr., Church Committee Hearings, Vol. 5, supra, at 16; Statement of NSA 
Director Bobby R. Inman, before Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence and Human Rights, as reported in the 
Washington Post, July 22, 1977, stating “Let there be no doubt, no U.S. citizen is now targeted by the NSA in 
the United States or abroad.” 
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acquire information.  These elements underscore the particularity that Congress insisted 
upon prior to foreign intelligence gathering. 
FISA incorporated a standard of probable cause.87  Unlike criminal law, however, in 
which the courts required that probable cause be established that a target had committed, 
was committing, or was about to commit a particular offense, under FISA, the agency 
requesting surveillance would have to demonstrate probable cause that the entity to be 
placed under surveillance was a “foreign power” or “an agent thereof”, and that the target 
was likely to use the facilities to be monitored.88 
Under certain circumstances, FISA also required a criminal showing for an entity to 
be considered a “foreign power”.  Excluded from this consideration were foreign 
governments. When they are directly involved, no showing of criminal activity is 
required.  A foreign government, regardless of whether it is an ally or an enemy of the 
United States, qualifies as a “foreign power.”89   
For groups that qualify as foreign powers because they are engaged in international 
terrorism, a criminal activity must be involved. The statute defines “international 
terrorism” to include, inter alia, “activities that…involve violent acts or acts dangerous to 
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or 
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United 
States or any State.”90  Acts in which individuals engage that would qualify them for 
inclusion in this category must be acts that would be criminal if committed within the 
United States. 
A group may be a “foreign power” not just when it engages in international terrorism, 
but when engaged in “activities in preparation therefor.”  This may or may not exceed the 
criminal “attempt” standard, which is broadly understood as requiring a “substantial step” 
towards the completion of an offense.91  Nevertheless, a “group” engaged in preparatory 
activities for international terrorism would satisfy criminal conspiracy standards.92 
For agents of a foreign power, Congress inserted heightened protections for U.S. 
persons.93 Specifically, FISA defines “agent of a foreign power” as: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
88 Compare 18 U.S.C. §2518(3)(a) (2006) (requiring, under Title III, that the court must find “on the basis of 
the facts submitted by the applicant that …there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, 
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter.”) and 
50 U.S.C. §1805(a)(3) (2006) (requiring, in contrast, that FISC find “on the basis of the facts submitted by 
the applicant,” that “there is probable cause to believe that…the target of the electronic surveillance is a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power:  Provided, That no United States person may be considered a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”)  Note that for ordinary criminal law, for wire and oral 
communications (e.g., telephone and microphone interceptions), §2516 enumerates predicate offenses that 
qualify, such as bank fraud (18 U.S.C §1344 (2006)), unlawful possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §922(g) 
(2006)), espionage (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §794 (2006)), assassination (e.g., 18 U.S.C §§351, 1751 (2006 & Supp. V 
2011)), sabotage (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §2155 (2006)), and terrorism (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §2332 (2006)).  For electronic 
communications (e.g., e-mail), any federal felony may serve as a predicate.  18 U.S.C. §2516(3) (2006).  
89 50 U.S.C. §1801(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
90 50 U.S.C. §1801(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
91 Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 351 (1991).  This is not broader, however, than the “overt act” 
requirement contained in some criminal conspiracy statutes.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §371 (2006).  See also 
discussion in In re [deleted], Appendix:  Comparison of FISA and Title III. 
92 18 U.S.C. §371 (2006).  
93 A “United States person” is understood under the statute as “a citizen of the United States, an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent resident (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated 
association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but does not 
include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of 
this section.”  50 U.S.C. §1801(i) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
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(1)  any person other than a United States person, who –  
(a) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as 
a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section; 
(b) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine 
intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the 
United States, when the circumstances of such person’s presence in the 
United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the 
United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in 
the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to 
engage in such activities; or 
(2)  any person who –  
(a) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on 
behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a 
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; 
(b) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign 
power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities 
for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about 
to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; 
(c) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that 
are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; 
(d) knowingly enters the United States under a false or frauduluent identity for 
or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly 
assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreing power; or 
(e) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in 
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to 
engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or C).94 
What these definitions mean is that U.S. persons may only be considered agents of a 
foreign power consistent with the five provisions in the second sections.  Taken together, 
three categories emerge for a U.S. person to be considered “an agent of a foreign power”:  
either the person (1) engages in espionage and clandestine intelligence activities; (2) 
engages in sabotage and international terrorism (or aids, abets, or conspires to do the 
same); or (3) enters the United States under a false identity.  This means that for U.S. 
persons, for the most part, evidence of criminality on a par with criminal law must be 
established prior to the collection of information. 
Looking more closely, the first category requires that the individual knowingly 
engage in espionage and clandestine intelligence activities. Unlike the other two 
categories, there is some variation here with criminal law, specifically with regard to the 
“may involve” standard of category (a).  Something less than the showing of probable 
cause required in ordinary criminal cases would satisfy this provision.  Thus, for 
counterintelligence operations, something less than probable cause is required for 
evidence of criminality. But for a U.S. person to fall into this category, some evidence of 
criminality is involved. 
For the second category, sabotage and international terrorism, the term “sabotage” is 
defined to mean “activities that involve a violation of chapter 105 of Title 18, or that 
would involve such a violation if committed against the United States.”95  “International 
terrorism,” in turn, as noted above, is also defined in terms of activities that are criminal 
or would be criminal if the United States were directly involved.  To be considered “an 
agent of a foreign power” (and thus subject to surveillance under FISA), a U.S. person 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 50 USC §1801(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
95 50 U.S.C. §1801(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
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must actually be engaged in such activities, or activities in preparation for sabotage or 
international terrorism—or knowingly aiding, abetting, or conspiring with others engaged 
in similar activities.96 
These provisions reflect criminal law standards.97  As the House of Representatives 
explained at the introduction of FISA,  
This standard requires the Government to establish probable cause that the 
prospective target knows both that the person with whom he is conspiring or 
whom he is aiding and abetting is engaged in the described activities as an agent 
of a foreign power and that his own conduct is assisting or furthering such 
activities.  The innocent dupe who unwittingly aids a foreign intelligence officer 
cannot be targeted under this provision.”98 
The third category, which allows a U.S. person to be considered “an agent of a foreign 
power” for knowingly entering the country under false or fraudulent identity, almost 
always involves a showing of criminality, for the simple fact that it is not possible to 
legally enter the United States without providing proof of one’s identity to a government 
official.99  It is similarly illegal to knowingly assume a false identity on behalf of a 
foreign power under anti-fraud provisions of the U.S. code. 
FISA’s deliberate engagement of criminal law provisions and standards has been 
acknowledged by the government in defense of bringing down the wall between 
prosecution and investigation. 
[A] U.S. person may not be an “agent of a foreign power” unless he engages in 
activity that either is, may be, or would be a crime if committed against the 
United States or within U.S. jurisdiction.  Although FISA does not always 
require a showing of an imminent crime or “that the elements of a specific 
offense exist,” Senate Intelligence Report at 13, it does require the government to 
establish probable cause to believe that an identifiable target is knowingly 
engaged in terrorism, espionage, or clandestine intelligence activities or is 
knowingly entering the country with a false identity or assuming one once inside 
the country on behalf of a foreign power.  Thus, while FISA imposes a more 
relaxed criminal probable cause standard than Title III, those differences are not 
extensive as applied to U.S. persons.100 
The government cannot have it both ways:  either U.S. persons have heightened 
protections under FISA—indeed, protections that rise to the level of those provided under 
Title III—or they do not. 
Congress provided yet further protections for U.S. persons. The statute limited the 
breadth of surveillance operations by requiring that probable cause could not be 
established solely on the basis of otherwise protected first amendment activity.101 This 
was meant to ensure that the executive branch could not place Americans under 
surveillance simply for exercising their First Amendment rights. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 50 U.S.C. §1801(b)(2)(E) (2006 & Supp. V. 2011).  
97 Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 (2006)  See also In re [deleted], on Appeal from the United States Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, Supplemental Brief for the United States, No. 02-001, Appendix:  
comparison of FISA and Title III, available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html. 
98 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, Part I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1978). 
99 18 U.S.C. §1001 (2006).  
100 In re [deleted], on Appeal from the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Supplemental 
Brief for the United States, No. 02-001, Appendix:  comparison of FISA and Title III, available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html. 
101 50 U.S.C. §1805(a)(2) (2006).  
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C.  Minimization Procedures for Acquisition and Retention 
A third protection inserted by Congress centered on the introduction of minimization 
procedures, in order to protect activity not related to foreign intelligence from 
government scrutiny.102 The legislature insisted here on minimizing not just the analysis 
of the information, but its “acquisition and retention.”103 Specifically, according to the 
statute: 
“Minimization procedures”, with respect to electronic surveillance, means— 
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are 
reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular 
surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons. . . 104 
Under FISA, only U.S. persons’ information must be subject to minimization 
procedures.105 
 
D.  Introduction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
As a further precaution against executive overreach, Congress provided in FISA for two 
courts:  the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review.  A key principle throughout the debates was the 
importance of heightened protections where U.S. persons’ information may be involved.  
The conference was deadlocked on this point until the Senate receded and accepted the 
House language exempting certain particularly sensitive surveillance (i.e., relating solely 
to foreign powers) from judicial review, on the grounds that (1) such surveillance did not 
involve U.S. persons; and (2) having removed the most sensitive information from 
external review, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court could be given a greater role 
in protecting the rights of each U.S. person targeted by the government.106  The use of a 
judicial element went some way towards providing for an independent, neutral, 
disinterested magistrate, to review the strength of the government’s case supporting the 
initiation of surveillance.107   
Initially, the statute provided for seven judges to sit on FISC; that number has since 
expanded to include eleven judges drawn from at least seven of the federal circuits, three 
of whom must reside in the Washington, D.C. area.108  Both the FISC judges and the 
judges on the court of appeal are selected by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.109  To avoid agency capture, judges may only serve for up to seven years, at the 
conclusion of which they are not eligible to again serve as FISC judges.110 
From the beginning, FISC’s role was significantly limited:  it was merely to grant or 
to deny applications for orders.111 The statute thus included extensive details about what 
would have to be included in such applications:  the identity of the Federal officer 
making the application, the identity, if known, of the target, a statement of the facts and 
circumstances relied upon to justify the applicant’s belief that the target is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power and that each of the facilities or places at which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
103 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (emphasis added). 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 124 CONG. REC. 36,409 (1978). 
107 Discussion with former members of the Church Committee, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 23, 2013). 
108 50 U.S.C. §1803(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
109 50 U.S.C. §1803(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) and 50 U.S.C. §1803(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
110 50 U.S.C. §1803(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
111 Id. 
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electronic surveillance is directed is being (or about to be) used by a foreign power or an 
agent thereof, a statement of the proposed minimization procedures, a description of the 
nature of the information sought, a certification from an executive branch official, a 
summary statement of the means by which the surveillance will be effected, a statement 
of the facts concerning all previous applications, and a statement of the period of time for 
which the surveillance is required to be maintained.112 
Where the government has met the necessary criteria, the judge’s role is to enter an 
ex parte order as requested, or to modify it accordingly.  Initially, such orders could only 
be issued in relation to electronic surveillance.  Subsequent amendments expanded 
FISC’s jurisdiction to physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices and 
business records or tangible things.113   These alterations, however, were merely in 
substance and not in form.  The function being performed by FISC throughout was the 
same:  it was merely to grant or to deny orders prior to the acquisition of information on 
particular targets. 
 
E.  Broad Congressional Support 
The Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978 represented the culmination of a multi-branch, 
multi-year, cross-party initiative directed at bringing the collection of foreign intelligence 
within a narrowly circumscribed, legal framework.  In 1972 the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure held extensive 
hearings on the subject of warrantless wiretapping.114 In 1975 the subcommittee issued a 
report jointly with a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, calling 
for Congress to introduce legislation governing foreign intelligence collection.115 In 1976 
President Ford and Attorney General Levi introduced the first foreign intelligence bill.116 
President Carter and Attorney General Bell subsequently supported S. 1566, which 
became FISA. 117  Congress consulted the NSA, FBI, CIA, and representatives of 
interested citizen groups, gaining broad support for the measure.118 
Because of the bipartisan, multi-branch approach taken to its construction, FISA 
passed by significant majorities.  S. 1566 passed the Senate 95 to 1.119 H.R. 7308 passed 
the House 246 to 128.120  In October 1978 the Senate adopted the Conference Report “by 
an overwhelming voice vote, with no dissenting voice vote.” 121  The House of 
Representatives, in turn, adopted the Conference Report by a vote of 226 to 176.122 
 
F.  Subsequent Amendment:  Traditional and Non-Traditional FISA  
Since FISA’s introduction, Congress has amended the statute to cover physical 
searches,123 pen register and trap and trace devices,124 business records,125 and tangible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 50 U.S.C. §1804 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
113 50 U.S.C. §§1821-1824 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (orders for physical search); 50 U.S.C. §1842 (pen 
register and trap and trace devices); 50 U.S.C. §1861 (2006) (business records and tangible goods). 
114 122 CONG. REC. 7543 (1976).   
115 Id.   
116 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, H.R. 12750, 94th Cong. (introduced in the House, Mar. 23, 
1976). 
117 124 CONG. REC. 36,409 (1978).   
118 124 CONG. REC. 37,738 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 36,414 (1978). 
119 Id.   
120 Id.   
121 Id. 
122 124 CONG. REC. 36,417-18 (1978). 
123 Pub L. No. 103-359, §101-909, 108 Stat. 3423, 3443 (1994); 50 U.S.C. §§1821-1829 (2006 & Supp. V 
2011).  
124 Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§601-02, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404 (1998); 50 U.S.C. §§1841-1846 (2006 & Supp. V 
2011).  
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goods.126 Because of their consistent structure and approach, these provisions have come 
to be referred to collectively as “traditional FISA”.127  In 2008 Congress further amended 
the statute under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, creating a new, non-
traditional surveillance authority. Recent information made public suggests that the NSA 
is making extensive use of both traditional and modern authorities to conduct broad 
surveillance programs, in the process obtaining significant amounts of data on U.S. 
persons. A brief discussion of the provisions helps to underscore Congress’ general 
approach in FISA and to elucidate ways in which these programs violate both the 
orientation of the statute and the existing statutory language. 
 
1.  Traditional FISA:  Physical Search, Pen/Trap 
Similar to the electronic surveillance provisions, physical search orders under FISA are 
limited by the government establishing the target of the search prior to acquisition of 
information. Specifically, physical search orders may only be used to target “premises, 
information, material, or property used exclusively by, or under the open and exclusive 
control of, a foreign power or powers.”128 The sub-section adopts the same definitions of 
“foreign power”, “agent of a foreign power”, “international terrorism”, “sabotage”, 
“foreign intelligence information”, and “United States person” as used elsewhere in the 
statute.129 It provides for FISC to grant or to deny orders consistent with FISC’s role in 
electronic surveillance.130 The government must make the same showings, particularly 
describing the target prior to FISC granting the order.131  And heightened protections are 
afforded to U.S. persons.132 
In 1998 Congress amended FISA to allow for the installation and use of pen register 
(recording numbers dialed from a particular phone) and trap and trace devices (acting as a 
caller ID record).133  The Attorney General, or a designated attorney, must submit an 
application in writing and under oath either to FISC or to a magistrate specifically 
appointed by the Chief Justice to hear pen register or trap and trace applications on behalf 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. 105-272, §602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998). 
126 Various further amendments of these sections have occurred.  The USA PATRIOT Act, for instance, 
changed the duration of certain FISA authorization orders (§207), increased the number of FISC judges to 11 
(§208); amended FISA pen/trap provisions (§214), changed the purpose of electronic & physical searches 
(§218), and authorized coordination between intelligence and law enforcement (§504).  ITRPA subsequently 
added a “lone wolf” provision via §60001(a). 
127 See, e.g., DAVID S. KRIS AND J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS, 
Chapter 12 (2d ed. 2012). In addition to the aforementioned amendments, in 2001 Congress amended FISA to 
take account of roving wiretaps. USA PATRIOT Act, §206 (amending §105(c)(2)(B) of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1805(c)(2)(B) (2006)).  This 
alteration reflected a change that had been integrated into criminal law measures in 1998.  At that time, the 
House Conference Report explained: “Under current law, judges issue wiretap orders authorizing law 
enforcement officials to place a wiretap on a specific telephone number.  Criminals, including terrorists and 
spies, know this and often try to avoid wiretaps by using pay telephones on the street at random, or by using 
stolen or cloned cell telephones.  As law enforcement officials cannot know the numbers of these telephones 
in advance, they are unable to obtain a wiretap order on these numbers from a judge in time to intercept the 
conversation, and the criminal is able to evade interception of his communication.”   
128 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006).  
129 50 U.S.C. § 1821(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
130 50 U.S.C. §§ 1822-1824 (2006).  
131 50 U.S.C. § 1823 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
132 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1821(1)(A)(ii) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring the Attorney General to certify in 
writing and under oath that “there is no substantial likelihood that the physical search will involve the 
premises, information, material, or property of a United States Person.”) and 50 U.S.C. § 1821(1)(A)(iii) 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring minimization procedures for U.S. persons information). 
133 Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§601-02, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404 (1998); 50 U.S.C. §§1841-1846 (2006) (pen/trap); 
50 U.S.C. §§1861-1862 (2006) (tangible things). 
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of the FISA court.134 Similar to the provisions related to electronic communications and 
physical search, the application must include information to show that the device has 
been, or will in the future be, used by someone who is engaging (or has engaged) in 
international terrorism or is a foreign power or agent thereof.135 In the event of an 
emergency, the Attorney General can authorize the installation and use of a pen register 
or trap and trace device without judicial approval.136  Nevertheless, a proper application 
must be made to the appropriate judicial authority within forty-eight hours.137   
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress relaxed the requirement for factual proof for 
placement of a pen/trap: the applicant no longer must demonstrate why he or she believes 
that a telephone line will be used by an individual engaged in international terrorism.  
Instead, the applicant must  demonstrate only that the information likely to be gained 
does not directly concern a U.S. person and will be relevant to protect against 
international terrorism.  This provision, hotly contested by civil libertarians, was 
scheduled to sunset on December  31, 2005.138   But in 2006,  Congress made it 
permanent.139  Critically, while it relaxes the standard for obtaining information from 
particular telephone lines, it still draws a higher bar for obtaining U.S. persons’ 
information. 
The statute understands the terms “pen register” and “trap and trace device” 
consistent with the criminal law standard—namely:  a pen register is: 
[A] device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or 
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facilitiy from which a wire 
or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such 
information shall not include the contents of any communication.140 
A “trap and trace device”, in turn, is defined as: 
[A] device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses 
which identify the originating number of other dialing, routing, addressing, and 
signalling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or 
electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not 
include the contents of any communication. 141 
In addition to all dialing, routing, addressing and signalling information sent from or 
received by a target, orders may require electornic communication service providers to 
disclose further information, including:   
(1)  the name of the customer or subscriber; 
(2)  the address of the customer or subscriber 
(3)  the telephone or instrument number, or other subscriber number of identifier, 
of the customer or subscriber, including any temporarily assigned network 
address or associated routing or transmission ifnormation; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)-(b) (.  As with the application for electronic surveillance, the applicant must include 
the name of the official seeking surveillance, as well as certification that “the information likely to be 
obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence or international terrorism investigation.” 50 U.S.C. § 
1842(c)(1)-(2) (2006).   
135 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
136 50 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
137 50 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
138 Uniting and Strengthening America by Proving Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. §1861 (2000 & Supp. V 2001)); 18 U.S.C. § 214 (2000). 
139 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, P.L. 109-177, § 102, 120 Stat. 192 
(2006). 
140 18 U.S.C. §3127(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
141 18 U.S.C. §3127(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
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(4)  the length of the provision of service by such provider to the customer or 
subscriber and the types of services utilized by the customer or subscriber; 
(5)  in the case of a provider of local or long distance telephone service, any local 
or long distance telephone records of the customer or subscriber; 
(6)  if applicable, any records reflecting period of usage (or sessions) by the 
customer or subscriber; and 
(7)  any mechanisms and sources of payment for such service, including the 
number of any credit card or bank account utilized for payment for such 
service.142 
Notably, what these passages demonstrate is that the collection of all of the information 
encapsulated in the NSA’s telephony metadata program is already provided for under 
FISA subchapter three.   
Unlike the NSA’s current practice, however, each order under the pen/trap 
provisions must be approved by either FISC or a magistrate judge appointed for the 
purpose of approving pen/trap orders under FISA.143  Orders must specify the precise 
identity (if known) of the person who is the subject of the investigation, and the person to 
whom is leased or in whose name the telephone line is listed.144   And heightened 
protections are provided for U.S. persons.145 
These provisions are entirely consistent with Congress’ approach in FISA:  namely, 
particularized showing in relation to the target, a decision prior to the collection of 
information, issuance of an individualized order by the court, and heightened protections 
for U.S. persons.  By inappropriately introducing the telephony metadata under 
subchapter four, the NSA is simply doing an end-run around the carefully thought-out 
protections of subchapter three.  I will return to this point, below. 
 
2. Traditional FISA:  Business Records, Tangible Goods, and Section 215 
Following the Oklahoma city bombing, in 1998 Congress amended FISA to authorize the 
production of certain kinds of business records of those suspected of being foreign 
powers or agents of a foreign power: namely, documents maintained by common carriers, 
public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities.146  Any 
records obtained under this provision had to be for “an investigation to gather foreign 
intelligence information or an investigation concerning international terrorism.”147  The 
application had to include “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the 
person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” 148 
As with the other provisions of traditional FISA, Congress assigned the terms 
“foreign power”, “agent of a foreign power, “foreign intelligence information”, and 
“international terrorism” the same meaning as employed in relation to electronic 
surveillance.149 Congress also required intelligence agencies to follow the same steps as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 50 U.S.C. §1842(d)(2)(c)(i) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
143 50 U.S.C. §1842(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
144 50 U.S.C. §§1842 (d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
145 50 U.S.C. §§1842 (c)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring “certification by the applicant that the 
information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or 
is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 
activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.”) 
146 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. 105-272, §602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.   
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those taken with regard to electronic surveillance: i.e., to submit an application to FISC to 
obtain an order, which then compels the companies to hand over the records.150 
Initially, the FBI did not heavily rely on the business records provision: between 
1998 and 2001, the Bureau only used it once.  Nevertheless, in 2001 Congress expanded 
the types of records that could be obtained, authorizing intelligence agencies to apply for 
an order from FISC “requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, 
records, papers, documents, and other items)”.151 Congress eliminated restrictions on the 
types of businesses or entities on which such an order could be served.152 It retained, 
however, the general contours of FISA, specifying that such items be obtained in the 
course of “an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.”153 Congress again added heightened protections for U.S. persons, 
requiring that such investigation, where directed towards a U.S. person, not be 
“conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the 
Constitution.”154  
In the new statute, Congress lowered the standard for obtaining Section 215 orders, 
eliminating the requirement that the application include “specific and articulable facts” 
indicating that the individual to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent 
thereof.155 
Nevertheless, from the beginning, the Department of Justice rightly understood that 
the information to be obtained under the tangible goods provision was still narrow, in that 
it must pertain directly to the person targeted in the authorized investigation.  A 
memorandum sent in October 2003 to all Field Offices explained: 
The business records request is not limited to the records of the target of a full 
investigation.  The request must simply be sought for a full investigation.  Thus, 
if the business records relating to one person are relevant to the full investigation 
of another person, those records can be obtained by a FISC order despite the fact 
that there is no open investigation of the person to whom the subject of the 
business records pertain.156 
The relevance standard adopted was thus specific with regard to the connection between 
the records sought and the target of the investigation, as well as limited, with regard to 
the actual establishment of a particular investigation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Id. 
151 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT Act”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  Congress also amended FISA to require that 
applicants to FISC certify that “a significant purpose” of the surveillance be to obtain foreign intelligence. 50 
U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  This shift, from the prior language that “the” purpose be to 
obtain foreign intelligence, had the effect of removing a wall that had built up within the Department of 
Justice between intelligence officers and criminal prosecutors.  The government argued that the latter should 
be allowed to advise the former concerning the initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA 
searches or surveillance. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 611, 623 (FISA Ct. 2002).  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review upheld the 
change.  In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).  This alteration, however, simply recognizes 
parallels between criminal violations and national security threats.  It does not suddenly shift the focus of the 
statute to allow intelligence agencies to collect information on millions of Americans not suspected of any 
wrongdoing. 
152 Id.   
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 USA PATRIOT Act § 215, Pub. L. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 1861 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).   
156 FBI Memorandum from General Counsel, National Security Law Unit, to All Field Offices, Business 
Records Orders Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Oct. 29, 2003), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/foia/field_memo.pdf.   
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For the first two years, attorney general guidelines only allowed business record 
requests as part of full field investigations.  In the same memo specifying that the records 
must be directly related to the person under investigation, the general counsel of the 
national security law unit indicated that the type of investigation that must already be 
established, and in relation to which the records being sought must pertain, “may be 
revised in the near future to allow the use of a FISC business records order in a 
preliminary investigation.”157  Near future indeed—two days later, on October 31, 2003, 
Attorney General issued a 38-page document, establishing new guidelines for national 
security investigations—and allowing agents to obtain business records during 
preliminary investigations.158 
Despite the expansion to preliminary investigations, the specificity embedded in the 
relevance principle remained.  In order to open a preliminary investigation, the Attorney 
General required in his 2003 guidelines that, inter alia, the individual targeted in the 
investigation be an international terrorist or an agent of a foreign power, or any 
individual, group, or organization engaged in activities constituting a threat to national 
security for or on behalf of a foreign power, or who may be the target of a recruitment or 
infiltration effort by an international terrorist, foreign power, or an agent of a foreign 
power.159   
There are two points to make about this construction.  First, the Attorney General 
emphasized particular “individuals,” “groups,” or “organizations” as the target of 
preliminary investigations.  This was consistent with FISA’s traditional approach.  
Second, only once a preliminary investigation was established could agents then make 
use of “authorized techniques” to obtain information (e.g., mail opening, physical search, 
or electronic surveillance requiring judicial order or warrant).160  This meant that the 
target had to be determined (in the course of which the FBI would open a preliminary 
investigation) prior to orders allowing for the acquisition of tangible goods could issue. 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act was set to expire December 31, 2005.161 
Congress has since renewed it seven times.162 It is now set to expire June 1, 2015.163  In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Id. 
158 The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence 
Collection (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf. 
159 Id. at 14. 
160 Id. at 15. 
161 Id. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-63 (amending Title V, Section 501 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, “Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign and International 
Terrorism Investigations, 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
162 An Act to Amend the USA PATRIOT Act to Extend the Sunset of Certain Provisions of that Act and the 
Lone Wolf Provision of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to July 1, 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-160, 119 Stat. 2957 (2005) (extension until Feb. 3, 2006); An Act To Amend the USA PATRIOT 
Act to Extend the Sunset of Certain Provisions of Such Act, Pub. L. No. 109-170, 120 Stat. 3 (2006) 
(extension until Mar. 10, 2006); USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (extension until Dec. 31, 2009); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 123 Stat. 3409 (2009) (allowing for a short-term, 60-day extension of 50 U.S.C. 
1861 until February 28, 2010); An Act to Extend Expiring Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act of 2005 and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 until 
February 28, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-141, 124 Stat. 37 (2010) (extension until Feb. 28, 2011); FISA Sunsets 
Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-3, 125 Stat. 5 (2011) (extension until May 27, 2011); PATRIOT 
Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (2011) (extension until June 1, 2015).   
163 PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (2011).  Note that in a race 
against the clock, President Obama signed the most recent, four-year extension of Section 215 just minutes 
before the midnight deadline May 26, 2011.  Patriot Act Extension Signed Into Law Despite Bipartisan 
Resistance in Congress, WASH POST, May 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/patriot-act-extension-signed-into-law-despite-bipartisan-resistance-
in-congress/2011/05/27/AGbVlsCH_story.html. A bipartisan group of lawmakers had rallied against the 
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2005, in the course of extending the tangible goods provision, Congress added language 
tying the section more closely to FISA’s overarching structure.  It required applicants to 
submit a statement of facts, establishing “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible 
things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat 
assessment).”164  The investigation to which the order is tied must be conducted under 
guidelines approved by the Attorney General.165  The purpose of the investigation must 
be “to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to 
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” 166  The 
underlying investigation may not be directed at a U.S. person based solely on otherwise 
protected First Amendment activity.167   
Tangible things are presumptively relevant to an investigation where they pertain to:  
(1) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (2) the activities of a suspected agent 
of a foreign power, themselves the subject of an authorized investigation; or (3) an 
individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the 
subject of an authorized investigation.168 
For certain materials—namely, library circulation records, library patron lists, book 
sales records, book customer lists, firearms sales records, tax return records, educational 
records, or medical records with information identifying an individual, only the Director 
of the FBI, the Deputy Director of the FBI, or the Executive Assistant Director for 
National Security may make the application; none of these individuals may further 
delegate their authorities in this respect.169 
In the 2005 amendments, Congress required “an enumeration of the minimization 
procedures” related to the retention and dissemination of any tangible things obtained.170 
Any orders issued “may only require the production of a tangible thing if such thing can 
be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of 
a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued by a court of the United States 
directing the production of records or tangible things.”171  As discussed, below, the 
telephony metadata program, by FISC’s own admission, fails to satisfy this statutory 
requirement. Any individual served with an order is gagged from telling anyone other 
than individuals to whom disclosure is necessary to comply with the order or an attorney 
to obtain legal advice or help with regard to producing the items sought.172 Under the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
measure, with the result that the USA PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 passed the Senate 72 to 23 
and the House 250 to 153. With President Obama at a summit in France, the White House took the unusual 
step of having him sign the bill with an autopen—prompting commentators to question whether it was legal 
under Art. 1(7) of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., PATRIOT Sunset Extension Act of 2011 “Signed” into 
Law, Law Librarian Blog, available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/law_librarian_blog/2011/05/patriot-
sunset-extension-act-of-2011-signed-into-law-.html; Originalism and the Autopen:  Obama’s “Signing” of 
Patriot Act Extension Constitutional, Constitutional Law Prof Blog, May 30, 2011, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/05/originalism-and-the-auto-pen.html.   The White House 
apparently relied on a memorandum opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel in 2005.   See Whether 
the President May Sign a Bill by Directing that His Signature be Affixed to It, Memorandum Opinion for the 
counsel to the President, July 7, 2005, available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/opinion_07072005.pdf. 
164 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106, 120 Stat. 196 (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.C. §1861 (2006).  
165 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(2)(A) (2006).  Such guidelines are issued consistent with Executive Order 12333. 
166 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106, 120 Stat. 196 (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.C. §1861(2006)).  
167 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
168 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(A) (2006) and 50 U.S.C. §1861(c)(1) (2006).  
169 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(3) (2006).  
170 Id.   
171 50 U.S.C. §1861(c)(2) (2006).  
172 50 U.S.C. §1861(c)(2)(E) (2006).  
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statute, an individual on whom an order has been served may challenge the legality of the 
order by filing a petition with the court within a year, requesting that the order be 
modified or set aside.173 
 
3.  Modern FISA and Section 702 
Until recently, FISA did not regulate any of the four activities (electronic surveillance, 
physical searches, pen/trap, or tangible things) when conducted abroad. If a U.S. person 
went overseas, their telephone calls could be monitored and their hotel room searched 
without regard to FISA. Authority stemmed from the President’s inherent constitutional 
authority, as channeled through Executive Orders, Department of Defense directives, and 
policy documents.174  Nevertheless, in recognition of the higher level of protection 
afforded to U.S. persons, SIGINT practice, prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
was not to listen in on, or to collect information on, Americans overseas.175  U.S. citizens 
within domestic bounds fell within traditional FISA. 
It thus came as a surprise when, in late 2005, the New York Times reported that the 
NSA had “monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail messages 
of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people in the United States without warrants.”176  
White House Press Secretary, Scott McClellan, initially refused to comment.177 But 
the next morning, President Bush went on national television to defend the surveillance 
operation.178 He grounded his power in the 2001Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force (passed by Congress one week after the September 11, 2001 attacks), and his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 50 U.S.C. §1861(f)(1)(B) (2006).  
174 Exec. Order 12333, § 2.5, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981) “The Attorney General hereby is delegated 
the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States 
person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement 
purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined 
in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power.  Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this order.”)  See also DoD Directive 5240.1, 
Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect US Persons, Apr. 5, 1988; NSA/CSS Directive No. 
10-30, Procedures Governing Activities of NSA/CSS that Affect US Persons, Sept. 20, 1990. 
175 [NSA/Central Security Services] U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18 [July 27 1993] at §3.1 (“The 
policy of the USSS is to TARGET or COLLECT only FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.* The USSS will 
not intentionally COLLECT communications to, from or about U.S. PERSONS or persons or entities in the 
U.S. except as set forth in this USSID.   If the USSS inadvertently COLLECTS such communications, it will 
process, retain and disseminate them only in accordance with this USSID.”). See also id. at §4.1.  
176 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (also 
writing “Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency 
to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity 
without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying. . .”) 
177 Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, James S. Brady Briefing Room, 12:33 pm, Dec. 16, 2005, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051216-1.html (“there’s a reason why 
we don’t get into discussing ongoing intelligence activities, because it could compromise our efforts to 
prevent attacks from happening.  And it could telegraph to the enemy what we are doing. . . And we don’t 
want to do anything to compromise sources and methods.  As for talking about the NSA, “that would be 
getting into talking about ongoing intelligence activities.  And they’re classified for a reason, because they do 
to the issue of sources and methods and protecting the American people.  And because they’re classified, I’m 
not able to get into discussing those issues from this podium.”) 
178 President’s Radio Address, Roosevelt Room, Dec. 17, 2005, available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html. (“I authorized the National Security 
Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international communications of 
people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations.  Before we intercept these 
communications, the government must have information that establishes a clear link to these terrorist 
networks.”) 
	   26 
constitutional authorities as Commander-in-Chief.179  Bush revealed that he had re-
authorized the program more than 30 times since 9/11.180 Each review, he said, had 
included the Attorney General and the Counsel to the President, with NSA’s activities 
further overseen by legal counsel at DOJ and NSA.181 Leaders in Congress also had been 
briefed on the program.182  Bush added, “This authorization is a vital tool in our war 
against the terrorists.  It is critical to saving American lives.”183 He stated that the release 
of the New York Times story had been illegal.184  The FBI immediately began an 
investigation into the leak, with 25 agents and 5 prosecutors assigned to the case.185 
The Administration soon offered a more detailed legal defense of the Terrorism 
Surveillance Program (“TSP”), largely consistent with the President’s initial 
statements.186 The Department of Justice explained that the purpose of the program was 
to “intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons 
linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations”.187 The Department cited “the 
President’s well-recognized inherent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and 
sole organ for the Nation in foreign affairs to conduct warrantless surveillance of enemy 
forces for intelligence purposes.”188  It referenced the President’s authority under Article 
II of the Constitution to repel acts of aggression. 189  And it argued that the language in 
the AUMF, giving the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Id. (“I am using authority vested in me by Congress, including the Joint Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, which passed overwhelmingly in the first week after September the 11th.  I’m also using constitutional 
authority vested in me as Commander-in-Chief.”)  See also Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 






185 Scott Shane, Obama Takes a Hard Line Against Leads to Press, N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/us/politics/12leak.html. 
186 See U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the national Security 
Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006) (available at  
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Attorney General to  The Hon. Pat Roberts, Chair, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The Hon. John 
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Representatives, Washington, DC, (Dec. 22, 2005)  (available at 
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187 U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the national Security Agency 
Described by the President, at 5, (Jan. 19, 2006) (available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf) 
188 U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the national Security Agency 
Described by the President, at 1 (Jan. 19, 2006) (available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf).  
189 U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the national Security Agency 
Described by the President, at 1 (Jan. 19, 2006) 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf; and Letter from William E. Moschella, 
Assistant Attorney General, to The Hon. Pat Roberts, Chair, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The 
Hon. John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The Hon. Peter 
Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, and the 
Hon. Jane Harman, Ranking Minority Member, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Washington, DC (Dec. 22, 2005) (available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj122205.pdf) (“This constitutional authority,” the Assistant 
Attorney General continued, “includes the authority to order warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance 
within the United States, as all federal appellate courts, including at least four circuits, to have addressed the 
issue have concluded.”) 
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the terrorist attacks” of September 11 to prevent “any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States” included traditional military activity—into which 
category warrantless communications intelligence fell.190 According to DOJ, this moved 
the decision into the first category of the tripartite framework established by Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.191  The government 
also relied on the War Powers Resolution, enacted less than five years before FISA, as 
allowing the President to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities.192 
Congress and others strongly objected to the legal analysis.  The Authorization of the 
Use of Military Force nowhere made reference to electronic surveillance; nor did the 
legislative history associated with the authorization.193 FISA, moreover, contemplated the 
advent of war, allowing for special procedures to be followed with respect to electronic 
surveillance, physical searches and pen/trap surveillance.194  It provided for a 15 day 
grace period, to “allow time for consideration of any amendment to [FISA] that may be 
appropriate during a wartime emergency.”195 At the expiry of the 15 days, absent any 
amendment, ordinary FISA provisions would have to be followed. This was a carefully-
constructed compromise position: during the debates on FISA, the House of 
Representatives had sought a complete abatement of FISA during periods of declared 
war. The Senate objected, and the House of Representatives changed its position. 
Congress (and the Courts) also had considered and declined to recognize claims to 
Presidential Article II authority to conduct foreign intelligence gathering within domestic 
bounds. During passage of FISA, the House wanted the statute to read that it was the 
“exclusive statutory” means for the Executive to conduct electronic surveillance, 
implying in the process that the President had inherent surveillance powers outside the 
statute.  The Senate completely rejected this notion, suggesting that if the President were 
to engage in electronic surveillance outside the parameters of FISA, on judicial review, 
they wanted the Supreme Court to treat the President’s actions as under Justice Jackson’s 
third category in Youngstown:  against the expressed intent of Congress.  The Senate 
view carried. 
The TSP turned out to be more far-reaching than initially acknowledged.  Five 
months after the initial revelations, on May 11, 2006, a USA Today article detailed how, 
since 9/11, the country’s largest telecommunications companies had been secretly 
providing customers’ domestic calling records to the NSA for analysis.  AT&T, Verizon, 
and BellSouth were implicated in the report.196 Once again, the White House defended 
the program, stating that no domestic surveillance is conducted without court approval.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the national Security Agency 
Described by the President, at 2 (Jan. 19, 2006) (available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf).  
191 U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the national Security Agency 
Described by the President, at 2 (Jan. 19, 2006) (available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf).  See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
192 U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the national Security Agency 
Described by the President, at 27 (Jan. 19, 2006) 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf.   
193 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
194 50 U.S.C. §1811 (2006) (electronic surveillance); 50 U.S.C. §1829 (2006) (physical search), 50 U.S.C. 
§1844 (2006) (pen/trap) (“Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General, may 
authorize [electronic surveillance, physical search, or pen/trap] to acquire foreign intelligence information for 
a period not to exceed 15 calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress.”) 
195 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 45 (1978) 
(Conf. Rep.).  
196 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, 
available at  http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm?csp=34. 
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According to Dana Perino, deputy White House Secretary, the appropriate members 
of Congress had been briefed.197  Nevertheless, the news seemed to take the then-
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) by 
surprise.198 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) sounded similarly incredulous, railing against 
the lack of congressional oversight and suggesting that the media was doing rather a 
better job of it than the legislature.  “Are you telling me that tens of millions of 
Americans are involved with al Qaeda?” Leahy asked.199 “These are tens of millions of 
Americans who are not suspected of anything. . . Where does it stop?”200   He held up a 
copy of the newspaper and added, “Shame on us for being so far behind and being so 
willing to rubber stamp anything this administration does.  We ought to fold our tents.”201 
General Michael V. Hayden, NSA director 1999-2005, defended the program to 
Congress and to the public by saying that the NSA was only targeting international 
communications – and only those U.S persons suspected of ties to terrorism. 202  
According to Hayden, attorneys inside and outside the agency considered that the 
program was constitutional—and vital to U.S. national security.203 Hayden’s language 
was strikingly similar to Church Committee hearings and Lt. Gen. Lew Allen Jr.:  “This 
activity was reviewed by proper authority within NSA and by competent external 
authority. . .”204  A major difference, of course, was that in the interim Congress had 
passed FISA, precisely to prevent this type of large-scale collection of information. 
In light of growing tension about the program, in 2007 the NSA discontinued it.205  In 
April of that year, the Director of National Intelligence J.M. McConnell submitted a 
proposal to Congress to amend FISA to make it easier for the executive branch to target 
U.S. interests abroad.  Four months later, Congress passed the Protect America Act 
(“PAA”), easing restrictions on the surveillance of foreigners where one (or both) parties 
were located overseas.206  The statute removed FISC from supervising the interception of 
communications that began or ended in a foreign country.  In its place, the Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence could authorize, up to one year, the 
acquisition of communications concerning “persons reasonably believed to be outside the 
United States”, where five criteria were met: 
1. there were reasonable procedures in place for determining that the acquisition 
concerns persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; 
2.  the acquisition did not constitute electronic surveillance (meaning it did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Id.    
198 Id.(reporting Specter as saying that “he would call the phone companies to appear before the panel ‘to find 
out exactly what is going on.’”) 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id.  
202 See, e.g., Jim Sensenbrenner, Directing the Attorney General to Submit to the House of Representatives 
all Documents in the Possession of the Attorney General Relating to Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of 
Telephone Conversations and Electronic Communications of Persons in the United States Conducted by the 
National Security Agency, H.R. REP. No. 109-382 (2006)  (citing, inter alia, Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, Press Briefing 
(Dec. 19, 2005); NSA Director General Hayden Press Conference (Jan. 23, 2006).  
203 Id. 
204 The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights:  Hearings Before the Select Comm. to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Cong. 22 
(1976).  
205 S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 4 (2007); and Letter from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to Senate Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 17, 2007). Note that these documents 
suggest that the program ran from just after the attacks of 9/11 until January 2007). 
206 Protect America Act, 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 553. (Aug. 5, 2007) (amending FISA, 
§105B(a)(1)-(5)), codified at 50 U.S.C. §1805b (2006)).   
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involve solely domestic communications); 
3.  the acquisition involved obtaining the communications data from or with the 
assistance of a communications service provider who had access to 
communications; 
4. a significant purpose of the acquisition was to obtain foreign intelligence 
information; and 
5.  minimization procedures outlined in the FISA would be used.207 
The PAA required the Attorney general to submit the targeting procedures to FISC and to 
certify that the communications to be intercepted were not purely domestic in nature.208  
Once certified, however, FISC was given no option as to whether or not to grant the 
order.  Twice a year the Attorney General would be required to inform the Intelligence 
and Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate of incidents or noncompliance with 
the directive issued by the Attorney General or Director of National Intelligence, 
incidents of noncompliance with FISC-approved procedures, and the numbers of 
certifications or directives issued during the reporting period.209  In addition, the PAA 
gave retroactive immunity to service providers to insulate them from civil liability.  The 
PAA initially was to operate for six months.210 Congress then continued it until February 
17, 2008.211   Congress eventually replaced the legislation with a more permanent 
measure: the FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”).212   
The FAA empowers the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
to jointly authorize, for up to one year, “the targeting of persons reasonably believed to 
be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”213 FISC 
annually reviews this certification but has no substantive role in the decision either to 
engage in the surveillance or to cease doing the same.  Five limitations apply to the order 
issued by the AG and DNI:  first, it “may not intentionally target any person known at the 
time of acquisition to be located in the United States.” 214   Second, it “may not 
intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if 
the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably 
believed to be in the United States.”215  Third, it “may not intentionally target a United 
States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.”216  Fourth, it 
“may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all 
intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United 
States.”217  And fifth, the collection of such information “shall be conducted in a manner 
consistent with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”218 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Id.  
208 Protect America Act, 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, § 3, 121 Stat. 552 (Aug. 5, 2007) (amending FISA §105B(c), 
codified at 50 U.S.C. §1805c (2006).  
209 Protect America Act, 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, §3, 121 Stat. 552 (Aug. 5, 2007) (amending FISA §105C).  
210 Protect America Act, 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, §6 , 121 Stat. 552 (Aug. 5, 2007). 
211 Various bills were proposed in the interim.  See, e.g., S. 2248 (2007).  
212 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (July 10, 2008).  
213 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, “Procedures for Targeting Certain Persons Outside the United 
States Other Than United States Persons, Title VII, Section 702, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2006).  
Except as otherwise noted, section 702 mirrors the definitions adopted in FISA for the terms “agent of a 
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The upshot is that Section 702 gives the NSA the authority to target non-U.S. persons 
located outside the United States at the time of the collection of data.219  FAA brought the 
targeting of U.S. persons overseas, previously addressed via Section 2.3 of Executive 
Order 12333, within traditional FISA. Consistent with the overall approach of FISA, this 
shift provided a higher protections for U.S. persons.  The FAA required, in addition, that 
the government adopt targeting and minimization procedures for review by FISC.  The 
minimization procedures, in particular, restrict handling information concerning U.S. 
persons incidentally acquired under Section 702—including the retention and 
dissemination of such information. In December 2012, Congress passed, and the 
President signed, the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act, extending Title VII of 
FISA through December 31, 2017.220  Absent intervening action by Congress, Title VII 
will automatically be repealed on that date.221  Any orders in place as of that date will 
continue until their ordinary expiration. 
 
IV. NSA TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION UNDER §215 
 
On May 24, 2006, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approved an FBI 
application for an order, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §1861, requiring telecommunications 
providers to turn over all telephony metadata to the National Security Agency.222  Over 
the next seven years, FISC issued orders renewing the program thirty-four times.223 As 
FISC acknowledged in classified rulings:  
[N]early all of the call detail records collected pertain to communications of non-
U.S. persons who are not the subject of an FBI investigation to obtain foreign 
intelligence information, are communications of U.S. persons who are not the 
subject of an FBI investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities, and are data that otherwise could not be legally 
captured in bulk by the government.224 
This program remained secret until a combination of the Snowden documents and FOIA 
litigation launched by the Electronic Frontier Foundation forced key documents into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 In exigent circumstances, the Attorney General and the DNI may authorize an immediate acquisition 
under Section 702; however, they must then submit a certification to the FISC as soon as practicable, but in 
no event later than seven days after they determined the existence of such exigent circumstances. 
220 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-238, 126 Stat. 1631. 
221 50 U.S.C.S. §1881 note (LexisNexis Supp. Apr. 2013). 
222 In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things 
from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No. BR-05 (FISA Ct. May 24, 
2006), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-
_ocr_0.pdf (released by court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s FOIA litigation).  Note 
that the specific telecommunications company from which such records were sought were redacted, as well 
as the remaining title; however, the government also released an NSA report that provided more detail on the 
title of the Order. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., ST-06-0018, 
REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER:  TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS (Sept. 5, 2006) (see page 94 of 1846 and 
1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf.  
For purposes of a more precise citation, I draw from both sources. 
223 Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata under Section 215 of the USA 
Patriot Act 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/750211-
administration-white-paper-section-215.html [hereinafter “Section 215 White Paper”]. 
224 In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 08-13, at 12 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 
2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf 
(emphasis in original). 
	   31 
public domain.225  In response, the Obama Administration issued statements, fact sheets, 
redacted FISC opinions, and even a White Paper, acknowledging the existence of the 
program and arguing that it is both legal and Constitutional. 
According to these document, the purpose of the telephony metadata program is to 
collect information related to counterterrorism and foreign intelligence. 226  The 
information includes all communications routing information, including (but not limited 
to) session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, 
identity of the communications device, etc.), trunk identifier, and time and duration of the 
call.227  The metadata collected as part of this program does not include the substantive 
content of communications [as defined by 18 U.S.C. §2510(8)], nor does it include 
subscribers’ names, addresses, or financial information.228  
Although many of the details about the telephony metadata program remain cloaked 
from view, from what has been made public by the government, it appears that the 
Government takes all information obtained and feeds it into a bulk data set, which is then 
queried with an “identifier”, referred to as a “seed”229 The NSA uses both international 
and domestic identifiers.230   
FISC requires that the NSA establish a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that a seed 
identifier used to query the data be linked to a foreign terrorist organization before 
running it against the bulk data.  Once obtained, information responsive to the query can 
be further mined for information.  The NSA can analyze the data to ascertain second- and 
third-tier contacts, in steps known as “hops”: 
The first “hop” refers to the set of numbers directly in contact with the seed 
identifier.  The second “hop” refers to the set of numbers found to be in direct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Electronic Frontier Foundation v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR, at 2, ¶1(b) (N.D. Cal. 
Jul. 19, 2013) (order responding to the request for records related to Section 215 as narrowed by negotiation 
between the parties in the litigation, i.e., orders and opinions of the FISC issued from January 1, 2004 to June 
6, 2011, containing a significant legal interpretation of the government’s authority or use of its authority 
under Section 215; and responsive “significant documents, procedures, or legal analyses incorporated into 
FISC opinions or orders and treated as binding by the Department of Justice or the National Security 
Agency.”). 
226 See, e.g., Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 3 (“The Government cannot conduct substantive 
queries of the bulk records for any purpose other than counterterrorism.”); id. at 4, “Query results can be 
further analyzed only for valid foreign intelligence purposes.”) 
227 Id. at 2. 
228 But note that the same arguments brought by the government in support of the telephony metadata 
program would support building similar databases of subscribers’ and customers’ financial records.  See 
Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 3.  In addition, the Aug. 9, 2013 White Paper is careful to note 
that the government does not collect cell phone locational information “pursuant to these orders.” Id. 
However, the same arguments that support the telephony metadata program would support the collection of 
precisely this information under other FISC orders. 
229 Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223 at 3.  Note that although the White Paper uses telephone 
numbers as an example of an identifier, it is conceivable that various other identifiers may be used.  In a 
recently-released memorandum, for instance, the government refers to “bins” or “zip codes”, suggesting that 
the types of queries can be significantly broad.  See Memorandum of the United States In Response to the 
Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 9, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 
(FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf. 
The Guardian, in turn, reports that the term “identifiers” includes information such as names, telephone 
numbers, email addresses, IP addresses, and usernames. See James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole 
Allows Warrantless Search for U.S. citizens’ emails and phone calls, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:08 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls 
(containing screen shot of classified document). 
230 Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 8, 10, In re 
Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf.   
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contact with the first “hop” numbers, and the third “hop” refers to the set of 
numbers found to be in direct contact with the second “hop” numbers.231 
It appears that, initially, neither FISC nor the NSA limited the number of “hops” that 
could be undertaken.  It was not until March 2009 that the Government implemented 
software changes to its system to limit the number of hops permitted to three.232   
As a practical matter, what this means is that the NSA currently understands the 
primary order as authorizing the agency to retrieve information as many as three tiers 
away from the initial identifier.233  The government refers to this process as “automated 
chaining.” 234   These results can then be further queried “for foreign intelligence 
purposes.”235  In some cases, this information can then be forwarded to the FBI for 
further investigation, including using the information thus obtained for applications for an 
electronic intercept order under Title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.236 
Like the programs that existed prior to the Church Committee hearings, the range of 
targets has gradually expanded.  Following the initial order, on at least three occasions, 
the government obtained authorization to expand the telephone identifiers that the NSA 
could query.237  And like the programs that led to the creation of FISA in the first place, a 
significant focus has been on domestic communications. 
Since the advent of the program, FISC has understood “that the vast majority of the 
call-detail records provided are expected to concern communications that are (i) between 
the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local 
telephone calls.”238  The government laid out its rationale: 
International terrorist organizations and their agents use the international 
telephone system to communicate with one another between numerous countries 
all over the world, including to and from the United States.  In addition, when 
they are located inside the United States, terrorist operatives make domestic U.S. 
telephone calls.  The most analytically significant terrorist-related 
communications are those with one end in the United States or those that are 
purely domestic, because those communications are particularly likely to identify 
suspects in the United States—whose activities may include planning attacks 
against the homeland.239 
The program is thus designed to obtain foreign intelligence or to protect against 
international terrorist threats in the United States and overseas.  Under the statute, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 3-4. 
232 Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 20, In re Prod. 
of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf. 
233 Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 4. 
234 Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 10, In re Prod. 
of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf.   
235 Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 4. 
236 Id. 
237 See generally Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 
4 n. 3, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), 
available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(“Authorizations after this matter was initiated in May 2006 expanded the telephone identifiers that NSA 
could query to those identifiers associated with [REDACTED] see generally docket number BR 06-05 
(motion to amend in August 2006)…docket number BR 07-10 (motion to amend granted in June 2007). The 
Court’s authorization in docket number BR 08-13 approved querying related to [REDACTED] Primary 
Order, docket number BR 08-13, at 8.”). 
238 Id. at 2 n. 1. 
239 Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 3. 
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data obtained is understood as “presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation” 
where the Government can establish that the information pertains to (a) a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power, (b) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power 
who is the subject of such authorized investigation, or (c) an individual in contact with, or 
known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of an authorized 
investigation.240 
Statutory requirements are designed to protect against the collection of information 
on U.S. persons.  Indeed, the statute limits the scope to obtaining foreign intelligence 
information “not concerning a United States person”.241  Where a U.S. person is involved, 
it must specifically be “to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.”242 
Despite special protections, the collection of information relating to U.S. persons, 
who are not themselves the target of any investigation, is central to the program.  Indeed, 
from the beginning, both the government and the Court were fully aware that, as a result 
of the broad approach—namely, the collection of all information, including that of a 
purely local nature—such information would be obtained.243  “Ordinarily,” Judge Reggie 
Walton later wrote, “this alone would provide sufficient grounds for a FISC judge to 
deny the application.”244  But in the face of Executive Branch claim, under oath, that the 
program was vital for U.S. national security, the Court acquiesced, requiring only that the 
Executive follow certain procedural protections.245  These protections failed to prevent 
abuses. 
The NSA’s telephony metadata program contradicts FISA’s language, design, and 
purpose.  To understand it otherwise would be to vitiate the statute in terms of Congress’ 
intent in introducing FISA and the general orientation of the statute, as well as the 
specific statutory restrictions placed on the intelligence agencies and duties assigned to 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.  The program also raises constitutional 
concerns with regard to search and seizure. 
 
V.  BULK COLLECTION RUNS CONTRARY TO FISA’S GENERAL APPROACH 
 
The telephony metadata program violates the general intent of Congress in enacting 
FISA—and the approach adopted in the statute itself—in two important ways:  first, in its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (2006). 
241 § 1861(b)(2)(A). 
242 § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. V. 2012). 
243 Id. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of 
Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13, at 2 n. 1 (FISA Ct. Jan 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Prelim%2
0Notice%20of%20Compliance.pdf (“As the government noted in its application, ‘[i]f authorized, the 
requested order will result in the production of call detail records pertaining to [REDACTED] telephone 
communications, including call detail records pertaining to communications of U.S. persons located within 
the United States who are not the subject of any FBI investigation.”). 
244 In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 08-13 at 12 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), 
available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf. 
245 Id. (stating that the Court had authorized the bulk collection of call detail records based upon: “(1) the 
government’s explanation, under oath, of how the collection of and access to such data are necessary to 
analytical methods that are vital to the national security of the United States; and (2) minimization procedures 
that carefully restrict access to the BR metadata and include specific oversight requirements.  Given the 
Executive Branch’s responsibility for and expertise in determining how best to protect our national security, 
and in light of the scale of this bulk collection program, the Court must rely heavily on the government to 
monitor this program. . .”). 
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rejection of particularization at the point of acquisition of information; and, second, with 
regard to the role played by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 
 
A.  Particularization in Place of Broad Surveillance 
The telephony metadata program lacks the particularization that marks Congress’ entire 
approach to domestic foreign intelligence gathering as articulated in the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.  Specifically, FISA rejects the wholesale collection of 
domestic information, insisting instead on minimization; relies on the prior targeting of 
foreign intelligence targets to justify surveillance; provides U.S. persons a heightened 
level of protection; and seeks to minimize the acquisition (not just the retention and 
dissemination) of information.  
 
1. Wholesale Collection of Information 
Project MINARET, which represented precisely the type of surveillance program that 
FISA was designed to forestall, was not nearly as extensive as the telephony metadata 
program at issue in this case.  Over the course of Project MINARET, for instance, the 
watch list expanded to include approximately 1,650 U.S. citizens in total.246 At no time 
were there more than 800 U.S. citizens’ names on the list, out of a population of about 
200 million Americans.247  
Today, in contrast, there are approximately 316 million Americans, United States 
Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clock (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/, most of whom would have been subject to the Verizon 
(and similar) orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”).  This 
number eclipses the total number of U.S. citizens subject to one of the most egregious 
programs previously operated by the NSA, which gave rise to FISA in the first place.  
The telephony program also goes substantially beyond the previous surveillance 
operation in its focus on calls of a purely local nature.  According to the Director the 
National Security Agency, Project MINARET did not monitor entirely domestic 
conversations.248 
In contrast, the Order issued in April 2013 by FISC specifically requires the 
collection of information “wholly within the United States, including local telephone 
calls.”249 Set to expire July 19, 2013, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
has confirmed that FISC has again renewed the order.250 
As discussed above, Congress designed the statute to be used in specific cases of 
foreign intelligence gathering. By limiting the targets of electronic surveillance, requiring 
probable cause, disallowing investigations solely on the basis of otherwise protected first 
amendment activities, and insisting on minimization procedures, Congress sought to 
restrict agencies’ ability to violate U.S. citizens’ privacy.  The business records provision 
built on this approach, adopting the same definitions that prevailed in other portions of 
the statute, and requiring that agencies obtain orders to collect information on individuals 
believed to be foreign powers or agents of a foreign power.  Congress later deliberately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 30, 33-34. 
248 Church Committee Report, Vol. 5, supra, at 36 (testimony of General Lew Allen, Director, National 
Security Agency). 
249 In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things 
from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., Secondary Order, No. BR 13-80 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013).   
250 Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Renews 
Authority to Collect Telephony Metadata (July 19, 2013), http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-
releases/191-press-releases-2013/898-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-renews-authority-to-collect-
telephony-metadata. 
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inserted “relevant” into the statute to ensure the continued specificity of targeted 
investigations. 
In addition, Congress empowered the FISC to consider each instance of placing an 
electronic wiretap.  The NSA’s program, in contrast, delegates such oversight to the 
executive, leaving all further inquiries of the databases to the agency involved.  Once the 
NSA collects the telephony metadata, it is the NSA (and not the FISC) that decides which 
queries to use, and which individuals to target within the database.  
This change means that the FISC is not performing its most basic function: protecting 
U.S. persons from undue incursions into their privacy.  Instead, it leaves the 
determination of whom to target to the agency’s discretion. Traditional FISA, as well as 
authorities under §702, depend upon the criteria in the statute being met prior to 
collection of information.  That is, the authorities apply at the moment data is acquired—
not when it is subsequently analyzed for more information. 
Although the government argues that intelligence is not acquired until it is mined for 
more information, or until a human operator is involved in the analysis, this is neither the 
statutory language nor the government’s own internal position.  The NSA’s own 
minimization procedures with regard to §702 state: 
In addition to the definitions in sections 101 and 701 of the Act, the following 
definitions will apply to these procedures:   
(a) Acquisition means the collection by NSA or the FBI through electronic 
means of a non-public communication to which it is not an intended party...251 
 
2. Prior Targeting to Justify Collection of Data 
The government has indicated that the information obtained from this program is 
important because, “by analyzing it, the Government can determine whether known or 
suspected terrorist operatives have been in contact with other persons who may be 
engaged in terrorist activities, including persons and activities within the United 
States.”252 The government sees the enormous number of records as central to the success 
of the program.253  Once the records are obtained—i.e., once the “haystack” is created—
the government can then go about finding out who the threats are—i.e., the proverbial 
needles in the haystack.254 
This process is exactly backwards.  The whole point of FISA is for the government to 
first identify the target, and then to use this to obtain information.  In contrast, the 
government is now arguing that it can obtain information, as a way of figuring out who 
the targets should be.  This runs directly contrary to FISA’s design. 
 
3. Heightened Protections for U.S. Persons 
In addition, as detailed above, there are myriad ways in which FISA creates extra 
protections for U.S. persons.  The statute itself came from revelations about the rather 
cavalier manner in which the intelligence agencies were treating Americans’ right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y General of the United States, Minimization Procedures Used by the National 
Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information pursuant to Section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended (Jan. 8, 2007), available at 
http://epic.org/2013/06/nsa-targeting-and-minimization.html. 
252 Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 2. 
253 Id. at 4 (“It would be impossible to conduct these queries effectively without a large pool of telephony 
metadata to search, as there is no way to know in advance which numbers will be responsive to the 
authorized queries.”). 
254 See, e.g., How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans, and Why Disclosure Aids Our Adversaries: 
Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of Deputy 
Att’y Gen. James Cole), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/video/how-disclosed-nsa-programs-
protect-americans-and-why-disclosure-aids-our-adversaries. 
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privacy.  These protections related to the targeting of U.S. persons—not just the later 
analysis and dissemination of information. 
Outside of minimization procedures relating to the downstream manipulation and 
dissemination of information, the telephony metadata program does not recognize any 
protection for U.S. persons at the moment of data acquisition.  This, too, contradicts the 
way the statute was structured. 
 
B.  Role of the Foreign Intelligence Court 
In at least three important ways, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court no longer 
serves the purpose for which it was designed. First, it was created to determine whether 
sufficient evidence existed to target individuals within the United States, prior to the 
collection of such information.  But the Court has abdicated this responsibility to the 
executive branch generally, and to the NSA in particular. Continued noncompliance 
underscores concern about relying on the intelligence community to protect the Fourth 
Amendment rights of U.S. persons. Second, Congress did not envision a law-making role 
for the Court. Its decisions were not to serve as precedent, nor was the Court to offer 
lengthy legal analyses, crafting in the process, for instance, exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement or defenses of wholesale surveillance programs. Third, 
instead of being a neutral, disinterested magistrate, the court has become highly 
politicized and appears to have failed to act as an effective check on the exercise of 
surveillance authorities. The manner of appointment of judges to the court, lack of 
technical expertise, and absence of an effective adversarial process has here harmed the 
Court’s ability to function. 
 
1. Reliance on NSA to Ascertain Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion  
FISC’s primary order authorizing the collection of telephony metadata required that 
designated NSA officials make a finding that there is “reasonable, articulable suspicion” 
(“RAS”) that a seed identifier proposed for query is associated with a particular foreign 
terrorist organization prior to its use.  Documents recently released as a result of court 
orders in a related FOIA case establish that for nearly three years, the NSA did not follow 
these procedures255—despite the fact that numerous officials at the agency were aware of 
the violation.256  Noncompliance incidents have continued. Collectively, these incidents 
raise serious question as to whether FISC is performing the functions it was designed to 
address. 
 
a.  Failure to Report Initial Noncompliance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [Redacted], Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance 
Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No.  BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Jan. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Prelim%2
0Notice%20of%20Compliance.pdf; see also DNI Clapper Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents 
Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Sept. 10, 2013, 
available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/. 
256 Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 25, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(listing seven people in the Signals Intelligence Directive, two from the Office of the General Counsel, and 
one additional person [REDACTED] who knew, or may have known of the problem since May 2006).  Three 
additional people from the General Counsel’s office and from SID became aware of the use of non-RAS-
approved identifiers via email on May 25, 2006. Id. at 26.  The DNI noted an additional “indeterminate 
number of other NSA personnel who knew or may have known the alert list contained both RAS and non-
RAS selectors. Id. at 26-27. 
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Although the NSA had been acting in contravention of the order since May 2006, it was 
not until early 2009, when representatives of the Department of Justice met with NSA 
representatives to be briefed on the NSA’s handling of the telephony metadata, that the 
illegal behavior was brought to FISC’s attention. 257   During the briefing and in 
subsequent discussions, DOJ representatives inquired about the alert process.  Learning 
of the process being used, DOJ personnel expressed concern that the program had been 
misrepresented to FISC.258  The NSA had been using identifiers employed to collect 
information pursuant to Executive Order 12333—not FISA—to search the telephony 
database.259   
DOJ informed FISC within a week of the meeting that the government had been 
querying the business records in a manner that contravened both the original order and 
sworn statements of several Executive Branch officials.260  The Court was not amused.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Id. at 27 
258 Id. 
259 NSA’s general SIGINT authorities derive from (1) Exec. Order No. 12333, §1.7, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 
(Dec. 4, 1981) (authorizing the NSA to “Collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, 
produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence 
purposes to support national and departmental missions”); (2) Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring, 
National Security Council Intelligence Directive 6 (Dec. 12, 1947) available at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/50/NSCID_No_6_Foreign_Wireless_and_
Radio_Monitoring_12_Dec_1947.PDF (noting that the DCI shall conduct all Federal monitoring of foreign 
propaganda and press broadcasts required for the collection of intelligence information to meet the needs of 
all Departments and Agencies in connection with the National Security and that the DCI shall disseminate 
such intelligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have an authorized interest 
therein); and (3) Department of Defense Directive 5100.20 (Jan. 26, 2010) available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510020p.pdf. (“[T]he National Security Agency (NSA) is the 
U.S. Government (USG) lead for cryptology, and its mission encompasses both Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) activities.  The Central Security Service (CSS) conducts SIGINT 
collection, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination, and other cryptologic operations as assigned 
by the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS (DIRNSA/CHCSS).  NSA/CSS provides SIGINT and IA guidance and 
assistance to the DoD Components, as well as national customers. . .”).  In addition, some, but not all, of the 
SIGINT activities undertaken by NSA are governed by FISA. Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. 
Alexander at 34, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 
2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf. 
When executing its SIGINT mission, NSA is only authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate 
information concerning U.S. persons consistent with Attorney General guidelines.  The current procedures 
approved by the AG are located in the Department Defense Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the 
Activities of DOD Intelligence components that Affect United States Persons at 24-37 (Dec. 11, 1982), as 
well as a classified annex to the regulation overseeing NSA’s electronic surveillance.  Declaration of 
Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 34, In Re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 
08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf. 
To administer the program, the NSA constructed two lists:  the first, an “alert list,” includes all 
identifiers (foreign and domestic) of interest to counterterrorism analysts.  Memorandum of the United States 
In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 10, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf.  
The second, the “station table”, is a historical listing of all telephone identifiers that had undergone a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion determination, including the results. Id.  But see Declaration of Lieutenant 
General Keith B. Alexander at 9, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA 
Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(referring to the first source as the “Address Database” and describing it as “a master target database of 
foreign and domestic telephone identifiers”). 
260 In Re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance 
Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13, at 2 (FISA Ct. Jan 28, 2009), available at 
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Judge Reggie Walton expressed concern “about what appears to be a flagrant violation of 
its Order in this matter.”261  The NSA had repeatedly misled the Court in its handling of 
the database.262  FISC immediately issued an order, directing the NSA to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the NSA’s handling of telephony metadata.263  It gave the 
government until Feb. 17, 2009 to file a brief to defend its actions and to help the Court 
to determine whether further action should be taken against the government or its 
representatives.264   
The NSA initially admitted only “that NSA’s descriptions to the Court of the alert list 
process . . . were inaccurate and that the Business Records Order did not provide the 
Government with authority to employ the alert list in the manner in which it did.”265  It 
further acknowledged, “the majority of telephone identifiers compared against the 
incoming BR metadata in the rebuilt alert list were not RAS-approved.”266 The actual 
numbers, reported to FISC in February 2009, were staggering:  as of January 15, 2009, 
“only 1,935 of the 17,835 identifiers on the alert list were RAS-approved.”267   
It was not that the NSA was unaware of the requirements established by the statute 
and by the Court.  The Attorney General had, consistent with the primary order, 
established minimization procedures, amongst which was the following: 
Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only after a particular 
known telephone number has been associated with [REDACTED][3] More 
specifically, access to the archived data shall occur only when NSA has 
identified a known telephone number for which, based on the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
the telephone number is associated with [REDACTED] organization; provided, 
however, that a telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Prelim%2
0Notice%20of%20Compliance.pdf. 
261 Id. at 4. 
262 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., ST-06-0018, REPORT ON 
THE ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
COURT ORDER:  TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS (Sept. 5, 2006) (see page 94 of 1846 and 1862 Production, 
Mar. 5, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(“The management controls designed by the Agency to govern the processing, dissemination, data security, 
and oversight of telephony metadata and U.S. person information obtained under the Order are adequate and 
in several aspects exceed the terms of the Order.”). 
263 In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [Redacted], Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance 
Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Jan. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Prelim%2
0Notice%20of%20Compliance.pdf. 
264 Id. at 2. 
265 Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 2, In re Prod. 
of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf.   
266 Id. at 11; see also id. at 6.  Note the NSA refers to FISC-authorized Business Record metadata as “BR 
metadata”.  In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 08-13, at 4 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 
2009) available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf. 
267 Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 11, In re Prod. 
of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf; 
see also Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 8, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf. 
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be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that 
are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.268 
Nevertheless, apparently, neither the Signals Intelligence Directorate nor the Office of 
General Council had caught the fact that nearly 90 percent of the queries to the bulk 
dataset had been illegal.269  Nor had they realized that their reports to FISC claiming that 
only RAS-approved numbers were being run against the bulk metadata were false.270   
In the meantime, the NSA had disseminated 275 reports to the FBI as a result of 
contact chaining and queries of NSA’s archive of telephony metadata.271  Thirty-one of 
these had resulted directly from the automated alert process.272  In a careful use of 
language, the government noted, “NSA did not identify any report that resulted from the 
use of a non-RAS-approved ‘seed’ identifier.”273  The government did not detail how 
complete the NSA had been in considering the reports; nor did it claim that none of the 
reports had resulted from non-RAS-approved identifiers.274  The government also did not 
address the dissemination of metadata reports within NSA and subsequent actions taken 
as a result of the process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009, In re Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 at 4, (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(citing Order No. BT 06-05, at 5).  
269 Id. at 11 (“Based upon NSA’s recent review, neither NSA SID nor NSA OGC identified the inclusion of 
non-RAS-approved identifiers on the alert list as an issue requiring extensive analysis.”). 
270 See, e.g., NSA Report to the FISC, Aug. 18, 2006, docket number BR 06-05 (Ex. B to the Government’s 
application in docket number BR 06-08), at 12-15, quoted in Memorandum of the United States In Response 
to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 13, In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], 
No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(“As of the last day of the reporting period addressed herein, NSA had included a total of 3980 telephone 
numbers on the alert list, which include foreign numbers and domestic numbers, after concluding that each of 
the foreign telephone numbers satisfied the standard set forth in the Court’s May 24, 2006 [Order]. . . . To 
summarize the alert system:  every day new contacts are automatically revealed with the 3980 telephone 
numbers contained on the alert list described above, which themselves are present on the alert list either 
because they satisfied the reasonable articulable suspicion standard, or because they are domestic numbers 
that were either a FISC approved number or in direct contact with a number that did so.”). See also 
Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 7, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(reprinting the same report text and stating, “in short, the reports filed with the Court incorrectly stated that 
the telephone identifiers on the alert list satisfied the RAS standard.  In fact, the majority of telephone 
identifiers included on the alert list had not been RAS approved. . .”). 
271 Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 17, In re 
Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf; 
Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 42, In re Production of Tangible Things From 
[REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(further noting that the 275 reports provided to the FBI tipped a total of 2,549 telephone identifiers as being 
in contact with identifiers used to query the system). 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 17. 
274 See also Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 36, In re Production of Tangible Things 
From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(“[The NSA] has. . . conducted a review of all 275 reports of domestic contacts NSA has disseminated as 
result of contact chaining [REDACTED] of the NSA’s Archive of BR FISA material.  NSA has identified no 
report that resulted from the use of a non-RAS approved identifier as the initial seed identifier for chaining 
through the BR FISA material.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
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Despite the gross violation of FISC’s order, the Government argued that FISC should 
neither rescind nor modify its order.275  As required by FISC, the NSA had undertaken an 
end-to-end system engineering and process review (technical and operational) of the 
NSA’s handling of BR metadata; it had undertaken a review of domestic identifiers to 
ensure that they are RAS-compliant; and it had undertaken an audit of all queries made of 
the BR metadata repository since November 1, 2008 with the purpose of determining if 
any queries had been made using non-RAS-approved identifiers.276  The NSA had again 
trained its employees and adopted new technologies to limit the number of “hops” 
permitted from an RAS-approved seed identifier to three.277  The government offered to 
take additional steps to avoid having the program shut down, all of which amounted to 
involving DOJ’s National Security Division more deeply in the telephony metadata 
program.278 
 
b.  Further Noncompliance 
Although the January 2009 incident represents the first admission of noncompliance that 
was made public, it is far from the first – or only – time that the NSA acted outside the 
scope of its authority to collect records under §215 of the USA PTRIOT Act.279  
Recently-released documents provide myriad further examples.   
In September 2006, for instance, the NSA’s Inspector General expressed concern that 
the agency was collecting more data than authorized under the order.280  (The NSA had 
been obtaining 16-digit credit card numbers as well as names/partial names contained in 
the records of Operator-assisted calls.281)  It later emerged that an over-collection filter 
inserted in July 2008 failed to function.282   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 2, 15-21, In re 
Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf.  
Note that No. BR 06-05 is the initial authorization of the telephony metadata program, May 24, 2006.  No. 
BR-08 was a renewal application, filed Aug. 18, 2006.  No. BR 08-13 is a subsequent authorization.  The 
May 2006 order, however, has seven tabs for different docket numbers, all of which have been redacted, 
suggesting that there are other, related programs underway. 
276 Id. at 19. 
277 Id. at 20. 
278 Id. at 20-21 (listing under “Additional Oversight Mechanisms the government Will Implement”:  (1) 
NSA’s OGC consulting with NSD on “all significant legal opinions that relate the interpretation, scope and/or 
implementation” of FISC orders related to BR 08-13; (2) NSA’s OGC providing NSD with copies of the 
mandatory procedures; (3) NSA’s OGC promptly providing NSD with copies of all formal briefing and/or 
training materials; (4)  arranging meetings among NSA’s OGC, NSD, and NSA’s SID prior to seeking 
renewal of the orders; (5) meetings once per period of future orders between NSA’s OIG and NSD; (6) 
review and approval of all proposed automated query processes prior to implementation). 
279 See, e.g., Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009, In Re 
Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Docket Number BR 08-13, p. 19, available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(Citing notice of compliance filed Jan. 26, 2009, which reports that between Dec. 10, 2008, and Jan. 23, 
2009, two analysts conducted 280 queries using non-RAS-approved identifiers).   
280 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., ST-06-0018, REPORT ON THE 
ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
COURT ORDER:  TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS (Sept. 5, 2006) (see page 95-96 of 1846 and 1862 
Production, Mar. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
(“[M]anagement controls do not provide reasonable assurance that NSA will comply with the following 
terms of the Order: ‘NSA may obtain telephony metadata, which includes comprehensive communications, 
routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information, trunk identifier, and time 
and duration of a call.  Telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communications, 
or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.’”). 
281 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., ST-06-0018, REPORT ON THE 
ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
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On October 17, 2008, the government reported to FISC that, after FISC authorized 
the NSA to increase the number of analysts working with the BR metadata, and had 
directed that the NSA train the newly-authorized analysts, thirty one (out of 85) analysts 
subsequently queried the BR metadata in April 2008 without even being aware that they 
were doing so.283  The upshot was that NSA analysts used 2,373 foreign telephone 
identifiers to query the BR metadata without first establishing reasonable, articulable 
suspicion.284  Despite taking corrective steps, on December 11, 2008, the government 
notified the Court that an analyst had not installed a modified access tool and, resultantly, 
had again queried the data using five identifiers for which no reasonable articulable 
suspicion standard had been satisfied.285   
Just over a month later, the government informed the Court that, between December 
10, 2008 and January 23, 2009, two analysts had used 280 foreign telephone identifiers to 
query the BR metadata without first establishing RAS.286 
The process initiated in January 2009 identified additional incidents where the NSA 
had failed to comply with FISC’s orders.287  In February 2009 the NSA brought two 
further matters to the court’s attention.  The first centered on the NSA’s use of one of its 
analytical tools to query the BR metadata, using non-RAS-approved telephone 
numbers.288  This tool had been used since the Court’s initial Order in May 2006 to 
search both the BR metadata and other NSA databases.289  Also in February 2009, the 
NSA notified NSD that NSA’s audit had identified three analysts who conducted 
chaining the BR metadata using fourteen telephone identifiers that had not been RAS-
approved before the queries.290 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
COURT ORDER:  TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS (Sept. 5, 2006) (see page 96 of 1846 and 1862 Production, 
Mar. 5, 2009), available at  
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf 
282 In Re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED] Order, Docket No. BR 08-13, Mar. 2, 2009, p. 
17, available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf 
(citing Government’s Response to the Court’s Order of Jan. 16, 2009, at 13). 
283 Order at 9, In Re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 
2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. at 10 (citing Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident at 2, No. BR 08-08, (FISA Ct. Dec. 11, 2008)) 
286 Id. (citing Notice of Compliance Incident at 2, No. BR 08-13, (FISA Ct. Jan. 26, 2009). 
287 Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 (U), In Re 
Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf; 
see also DNI Clapper Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 
501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Sept. 10, 2013, available at 
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/; Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223,  at 5 (“Since the telephony 
metadata collection program under Section 215 was initiated, there have been a number of significant 
compliance and implementation issues that were discovered. . . The incidents, and the Court’s responses, 
were. . . reported to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees in great detail.”) 
288 Notice of Compliance Incidents (U) at 2, In Re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. 
BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2026%202009%20Notification%20of%20Compliance
%20Incident.pdf. 
289 Id. at 3. 
290 According to Keith Alexander’s Supplemental Declaration, “One analyst conducted contact chaining 
queries on four non-RAS-approved telephone identifiers on November 5, 2008; A second analyst conducted 
one contact chaining query on one non-RAS-approved telephone identifier on November 18, 2008; and A 
third analyst conducted contact chaining queries on three non-RAS-approved telephone identifiers on 
December 31, 2008; one non-RAS approved identifier on January 5, 2009; three non-RAS approved 
identifiers on January 15, 2009; and two non-RAS approved identifiers on January 22, 2009.”  Supplemental 
Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, United States Army, Director of the National Security 
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In May 2009, two additional compliance issues arose.291   The first compliance 
incident is completely redacted.  The second notes a dissemination-related problem:  
namely, that the unminimized results of some queries of metadata had been “uploaded 
[by NSA] into a database to which other intelligence agencies. . . had access.”292 
According to the government, providing other agencies access to this information may 
have resulted in the dissemination of U.S. person information in violation of both US 
Signals Intelligence Directive 18 as well as the more restrictive restrictions imposed by 
the Court in BR 09-06.293 
 
c.  FISC Response 
Repeatedly, instead of rescinding prior collection programs, FISC merely imposed further 
requirements on the government.294  By spring of 2009, the Court had become fed up 
with the NSA—yet, not enough to actually halt the program. Instead, it insisted on two 
procedures designed to give FISC greater insight into how the NSA was using and 
distributing information related to the telephony metadata:  that NSA return to FISC prior 
to each query of the database; and that NSA file weekly reports with FISC detailing any 
dissemination of the information.  Both protections proved temporary. 
FISC’s first temporary solution was to require what traditional FISA actually 
required:  namely, NSA application to FISC prior to targeting. Between institution of the 
review and the final report, FISC required the NSA to seek approval to query the 
database on a case-by-case basis.  The Court was particularly concerned that the NSA 
had averred that having access to all call detail records,  
“is vital to NSA’s counterterrorism intelligence mission” because “[t]he only 
effective means by which NSA analysts are able continuously to keep track of 
[REDACTED] and all affiliates of one of the aforementioned entities [who are 
taking steps to disguise and obscure their communications and identities], is to 
obtain and maintain an archive of metadata that will permit these tactics to be 
uncovered.”295 
According to FISC, the NSA had also suggested that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Agency at 8, In Re Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2026%202009%20Notification%20of%20Compliance
%20Incident.pdf. 
291 Order at 4, In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 09-06 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009) (referencing 
Government responses to the Court’s May 29, 2009 Supplemental Order), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Jun%2022%202009%20Order.pdf. 
292 Id. at 5 (quoting Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident at 2, No. BR 09-06 (FISA Ct. June 16, 2009), 
in Docket No. BR 09-06, at 2.  
293 Id.  
294 The government cites multiple other cases, with key information redacted as follows:  “[REDACTED] 
Primary Order, docket number [REDACTED] at 11-12 (requiring, in response to an incident of non-
compliance, NSA to file with the Court every thirty days a report discussing, among other things, queries 
made since the last report to the Court and NSA’s application of the relevant standard); see also 
[REDACTED] docket numbers [FULL LINE REDACTED] (prohibiting the querying of data using “seed” 
accounts validated using particular information).” Memorandum of the United States in Response to the 
Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 (U) at 16, In Re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. 
BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf.   
295 Order at 2, In Re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 
2009) (quoting Application Exhibit A, Declaration of [REDACTED], Signals Intelligence Directorate Deputy 
Program Manager [REDACTED], NSA at 5, In Re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. 
BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Dec. 11, 2008)), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf. 
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“[t]o be able to exploit metadata fully, the data must be collected in bulk. . . The 
ability to accumulate a metadata archive and set it aside for carefully controlled 
searches and analysis will substantially increase NSA’s ability to detect and 
identify members of [REDACTED].”296 
Because the Order being sought meant, if granted, that the NSA would be collecting call 
detail records of U.S. persons located within the United States, who were not themselves 
the target of any FBI investigation and whose metadata could not otherwise be legally 
obtained in bulk, FISC had adopted minimization procedures.  It had required, inter alia, 
that: 
Access to the archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a known 
telephone identifier for which, based on the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts 
giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone identifier is 
associated with [REDACTED].297 
The Court had a difficult time believing the NSA’s claim that its non-compliance with the 
Court’s orders resulted from NSA personnel believing that the Court’s restrictions on 
access to the BR metadata only applied to “archived data” (namely, data located in 
certain databases).  “That interpretation of the Court’s Orders,” Judge Reggie Walton 
wrote, “strains credulity.”298  The NSA had compounded its bad behavior by repeatedly 
submitting inaccurate descriptions of how it developed and used the alert list process.299  
In return for its claim that the program was vital for U.S. national security, the NSA had 
offered as evidence the rather paltry claim that, after nearly three years of sweeping up all 
telephony metadata, the NSA had generated 275 domestic security reports that, in turn, 
had spurred three preliminary investigations.300 
FISC objected to the government’s assertion that “the Court need not take any further 
remedial action”301 Until the NSA completed the review, “the Court sees little reason to 
believe that the most recent discovery of a systemic, ongoing violation – on February 18, 
2009 – will be the last.”302 Accordingly, starting in March 2009, while the NSA could 
continue to collect data and to test the telephony metadata system, it would only be 
allowed to query it with a Court order—or, in an emergency, to query the database and 
then to inform the court by 5:00 pm, Eastern Time, on the next business day.303 In 
September 2009, however, FISC lifted the requirement for the NSA to seek approval in 
every case. 
The second protection introduced by FISC was, starting on July 3, 2009, to require 
the NSA to file a weekly report with the Court, listing each time, over the seven-day 
period ending the previous Friday, in which the NSA had shared, “in any form, 
information obtained or derived from the [REDACTED] BR metadata collections with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 Id. (quoting Application Exhibit A, Declaration of [REDACTED], Signals Intelligence Directorate Deputy 
Program Manager [REDACTED], NSA at 5–6, In Re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], 
No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Dec. 11, 2008)). 
297 Id. at 3 (referencing re-authorization to BR 08-13, dating from Dec. 12, 2008). 
298 Id. at 5. 
299 Id. at 6. 
300 Id. at 13 (“the mere commencement of a preliminary investigation, by itself, does not seem particularly 
significant. . . The time has come for the government to describe to the Court how, based on the information 
collected and analyzed during [the duration of the program], the value of the program to the nation’s security 
justifies the continued collection and retention of massive quantities of U.S. person information.”) 
301 Id. at 14 (quoting Notice of Compliance Incident at 6, In Re Production of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 26, 2009)). 
302 Id. at 16. 
303 Id. at 18–19. 
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anyone outside NSA.”  Again, consistent with traditional FISA, the Court added special 
protections for U.S. persons: 
For each such instance, the government shall specify the date on which the 
information was shared, the recipient of the information, and the form in which 
the information was communicated (e.g., written report, email, oral 
communication, etc.).  For each such instance in which U.S. person information 
has been shared, the Chief of Information Sharing of NSA’s Signals Intelligence 
Directorate shall certify that such official determined, prior to dissemination, the 
information to be related to counterterrorism information and necessary to 
understand the counterterrorism information or to assess its importance.304 
In August 2009 the government submitted its end-to-end assessment of the NSA 
telephony metadata system. 305   FISC lifted its requirements, leaving dissemination 
decisions in the future up to the NSA.  It is at least questionable the extent to which the 
requirements with which the NSA was left perform an effective check on the exercise of 
authorities. Prior to the dissemination of information of U.S. persons’ information outside 
the Agency, an NSA official must determine that the information is “related to 
counterterrorism information and is necessary to understand the counterterrorism 
information or assess its importance.”306  Since the government already considers all of 
the information in the database to be relevant to counterterrorism investigations, and has 
already argued to FISC (and FISC as agreed), that the collection of such data is necessary 
to understand its counterterrorism information, the degree to which this really prevents 
such dissemination is open to question. 
 
d.  Technological Gap 
A critical part of FISC’s failure to provide effective oversight of the process relates to the 
Court’s decision to have the NSA perform the targeting decision. Part of the problem also 
stems from the court’s discomfort with the technological aspects of the collection and 
analysis of digital information.  For much of the discussion of noncompliance incidents, 
for instance, it appears that neither the NSA nor FISC has an adequate understanding of 
how the algorithms operate. Neither did they understand the type of information that had 
been incorporated into different databases, and whether they had been subjected to the 
appropriate legal analysis prior to data mining.  
A similar problem may accompany the reporting requirements to Congress. In March 
2009, for example, the Department of Justice had submitted several FISC opinions and 
Government filings relating to the discovery and remediation of compliance incidents in 
its handling of bulk telephony metadata to the Chairmen of the Intelligence and Judiciary 
Committees.307  A subsequent letter noted that the House and Senate Intelligence and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Order at 7, In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-06 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Jun%2022%202009%20Order.pdf.  
305 Report of the United States, In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 




306 Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 5.  
307 Letter from M. Faith Burton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to the Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, 
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate; the Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, Select Committee on 
Intelligence, U.S. Senate, the Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of 
Representatives, the Hon. Silvestre Reyes, Chairman, Permanent Select committee on Intelligence U.S. 
House of Representatives, Mar. 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Mar%205%202009%20Cover%20Letter%20to%20Chairm
an%20of%20Intel%20and%20Judiciary%20Committees.pdf. 
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Judiciary Committees had received briefings in March, April, and August, before 
receiving a copy of the NSA’s review in September 2009.308  To the extent that the 
representations of the agency are heavily dependent on technical knowledge, the 
implications may not be readily transparent to lawmaker. 
 
2. Detailed Legal Reasoning and Creation of Precedent  
To enforce the specialized probable cause standard encapsulated in the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress created a court of specialized but exclusive 
jurisdiction.309  Its job was, narrowly, to ascertain whether sufficient probable cause 
existed for a target to be considered a foreign power, or an agent thereof, whether the 
applicant had provided the necessary details for the surveillance, and whether the 
appropriate certifications and findings had been made. It is thus surprising that the 
government considers these orders now to be evidence of precedent, on the basis of 
which, it argues, the programs are legal.310 But even more surprising is the recent public 
discovery that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance court has greatly broadened the 
“special-needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment to embrace wholesale data 
collection. 311  What is emerging is a complex body of law, establishing doctrines 
unrecognized by the Supreme Court, which is considered precedent for future 
applications to FISC. 
Specifically, in 2008 FISCR looked back at its decision in In re Sealed Case to 
confirm “the existence of a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.”312  
It acknowledged that FISCR had “avoided an express holding that a foreign intelligence 
exception exists by assuming arguendo that whether or not the warrant requirements were 
met, the statute could survive on reasonableness grounds.”313 
In In Re Directives, FISCR went on to determine that, as a federal appellate court, in 
the Fourth Amendment context, it would “review findings of fact for clear error and legal 
conclusions (including determinations about the ultimate constitutionality of government 
searches or seizures) de novo.” 314   It then asserted, for the first time, a foreign 
intelligence surveillance exception to the Fourth Amendment:   
The question. . . is whether the reasoning of the special needs cases applies by 
analogy to justify a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement for 
surveillance undertaken for national security purposes and directed at a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States.  Applying principles derived from the special needs cases, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 DNI Clapper Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Sept. 10, 2013, available at 
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/; and Letter from  Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, to the Hon. 
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate; the Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, 
Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, the Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the 
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, the Hon. Silvestre Reyes, Chairman, Permanent Select committee 
on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Sep%203%202009%20Cover%20letter%20to%20Chairma
n%20of%20the%20Intelligence%20and%20Judiciary%20Committees.pdf. 
309 See Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical 
Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 244 (2007).  
310 Hearing on Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance Program 
before the S. Judiciary Comm., 118th Cong. (July 31, 2013). 
311 See also Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., NEW YORK TIMES, July 7, 
2013, at A1. 
312 In Re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
551 F.3d 1004, 1010 (FISA Ct. of Rev. 2008). 
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conclude that this type of foreign intelligence surveillance possesses 
characteristics that qualify it for such an exception.315 
The court analogized the exception to the 1989 Supreme Court consideration of the 
warrantless drug testing of railway workers, on the grounds that a minimal intrusion on 
privacy could be justified by the government’s need to respond to an overriding public 
danger.316 
The government subsequently cited In re Directives decision in its August 9, 2013 
White Paper, defending the telephony metadata program, in support of an exception to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.317  
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court continues to go beyond its mandate. In 
August 2013, for instance, the Court issued a 29-page Amended Memorandum Opinion 
regarding the July 18, 2013 application by the FBI for the telephony metadata program.318  
Appending the 17-page order to the opinion, Judge Claire V. Eagan considered Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the statutory language of Section 215, and the canons of 
statutory construction, to justify granting the order.319 
Similarly, in a per curiam opinion of 2002, FISCR suggested “this case raises 
important questions of statutory interpretation, and constitutionality.  After a careful 
review of the briefs. . . we conclude that FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, supports 
the government’s position, and that the restrictions imposed by the FISA court are not 
required by FISA or the Constitution.”320 
Congress did not design the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Court of 
Review to develop its own jurisprudence.  Particularly in light of the lack of adversarial 
process, it is deeply concerning that the Court’s decisions have taken on a force of their 
own.  The politicization of the court further underscores the danger inherent in the status 
quo. 
 
3.  Politicization 
Congress tried to avoid the politicization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
by requiring that (a) the eleven judges be selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court from at least seven different federal districts; (b) the judges serve staggered terms 
of up to seven years; and (c) having once served, such judges are ineligible for further 
service.321 To ensure further diversity, any federal district court judge (including a senior 
judge), who has not previously served on FISC, may be selected.322  The Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, in turn, is comprised of judges selected by the 
Chief Justice.323  
The problem with this system is that it has failed. To the extent that political ideology 
reflects in the appointments process, the court can only be viewed as highly politicized. 
The past two Chief Justices have been appointed by Republican presidents, and their 
selections for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review have been 
heavily weighted towards judges that have been nominated by Republican 
Administrations.  (See Fig. 1) Only one of the current eleven judges serving on FISC is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Id. at 1011. 
316 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989). 
317 Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 15. 
318 In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of 
Tangible things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109 (FISC. 2013). 
319 Id. 
320 In Re Sealed Case No. 02-002, (FISA Ct. of Rev., Sept. 9, 2002). 
321 50 U.S.C. §1803(e), (d) (2010). 
322 50 U.S.C. §1803(a) (2010). 
323 50 U.S.C. §1803(b) (2010). 
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Democratic nominee. Over the past decade, of the 20 judges appointed to FISC and 
FISCR, only three were democratic nominees to the bench.  
At least two of the nominees to the court over the past decade, moreover, have 
rejected FISA as being an unconstitutional intrusion on the President’s inherent 
authorities. Laurence Silberman, from the DC Circuit, testified to Congress in 1978 
(when FISA was being debated) that the legislation violated the U.S. Constitution.324  
Silberman, who had previously served as Deputy Attorney General, was “absolutely 
convinced that the administration bill, if passed, would be an enormous and fundamental 
mistake which the congress and the American people would have reason to regret.”325  
For Silberman, the judiciary’s role in any national security electronic surveillance should 
be circumscribed. He explained, 
I find the notion that the President’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign 
affairs and to command the armed forces precludes congressional intervention 
into the manner by which the executive branch gathers intelligence, by electronic 
or other means, to be unpersuasive, and in that respect I agree with my colleague 
here to the left.  But to concede the propriety of a congressional role in this 
matter is by no means—and this is the burden of my testimony—to concede the 
propriety or constitutionality of the judicial role created by the administration’s 
bill.326 
The chief concern was not a so-called “imperial Presidency”, but the advent of an 
imperial judiciary.  The authorities thus transferred to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court represented an unconstitutional erosion of executive power.327  In 
addition to Silberman, Ralph Guy, a 6th Circuit judge, as a U.S. attorney, argued for the 
government in U.S. v. U.S. District Court, that the president did not need any type of a 
warrant to engage in national security surveillance.328   
Along with Judge Leavy, a Reagan appointee, Silberman and Guy heard the first 
appeal in the history of FISA—issuing a decision that made it possible for the 
government to use the looser restrictions in FISA even in cases where the primary 
purpose of the investigation was criminal in nature.329 
The FISCR panel that created a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement similarly lacked a diverse political base:  the three-
judge panel included Chief Judge Selya and Senior Circuit Judges Winter and Arnold—
the first two appointees of Ronald Reagan and the last of George H.W. Bush. 
 
JUDGES APPOINTED TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
AND COURT OF REVIEW BY ORIGINAL APPOINTMENT TO THE BENCH330 
 
District Judge  Court Dates of appointment  Appointing President 
Rosemary M. Collyer* FISC 3/8/2013 – 3/7/2020 George W. Bush 
Claire Eagan* FISC 2/13/2013 – 5/18/2019 George W. Bush 
Michael W. Mosman* FISC 5/4/2013 – 5/3/2020 George W. Bush 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, 9745, 7308, and 5632 Before the 
Subcomm. on Legislation of the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 221 (1978) 
(statement of Laurence H. Silberman, Feb. 8, 1978). 
325 Id. 
326 Id. at 219. 
327 Id. 
328 United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
329 In re Sealed Case No. 02-002, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, Sept. 9, 2002. 
330 Dates of appointment obtained from the Federation of American Scientists, available at 
http://www.fas.org/.	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Raymond J. Dearie* FISC 7/2/2012 – 7/1/2019 Ronald Reagan 
William C. Bryson** FISCR 12/1/2011 – 5/18/2018 Bill Clinton 
Jennifer B. Coffman FISC 5/19/2011 – 1/8/2013 Bill Clinton 
F. Dennis Saylor IV* FISC 5/19/2011 – 5/18/2018 George W. Bush 
Martin L.C. Feldman* FISC 5/19/2010 – 5/18/2017 Ronald Reagan 
Susan Webber Wright* FISC 5/19/2009 – 5/18/2016 George H.W. Bush 
Thomas Hogan* FISC 5/19/2009 – 5/18/2016 Ronald Reagan 
Morris Arnold** FISCR 6/13/2008 – 5/18/2015 George H.W. Bush 
James Zagel* FISC 5/19/2008 – 5/18/2015 Ronald Reagan 
Mary A. McLaughlin* FISC 5/19/2008 – 5/18/2015 Bill Clinton 
Reggie Walton* FISC  5/19/2007 – 5/18/2014 George W. Bush 
Roger Vinson FISC 5/4/2006 – 5/3/2013 Ronald Reagan 
John D. Bates FISC 2/22/2006 – 2/21/2013 George W. Bush 
Bruce M. Selya FISCR  5/19/2005 – 5/18/2012 Ronald Reagan 
Malcolm Howard FISC 5/19/2005 – 5/18/2012 Ronald Reagan 
Frederick J. Scullin FISC 5/19/2004 – 5/18/2011 Ronald Reagan 
Dee Benson FISC 4/8/2004 – 4/7/2011 George W. Bush 
Ralph Winter FISCR 11/14/2003 – 5/18/2010 Ronald Reagan 
George Kazen FISC 7/15/2003 – 5/18/2010 Jimmy Carter 
Robert Broomfield FISC 10/1/2002 – 5/18/2009 Ronald Reagan 
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly FISC  5/19/2002 – 5/18/2009 Bill Clinton 
James G. Carr FISC 5/19/2002 – 5/18/2008 Bill Clinton 
James Robertson FISC 5/19/2002 – 12/19/2005 Bill Clinton 
John Edward Conway FISC 5/19/2002 – 10/30/2003 Ronald Reagan 
Edward Leavy FISCR  9/25/2005 – 5/18/2008 Ronald Reagan 
Nathaniel M. Gorton FISC 5/19/2001 – 5/18/2008 George W. Bush 
Claude M. Hilton FISC 5/18/2000 – 5/18/2007 Ronald Reagan 
Michael J. Davis FISC 5/18/1999 – 5/18/2006 Bill Clinton 
Ralph B. Guy, Jr. FISCR  10/8/1998 – 5/18/2005 Gerald Ford 
Harold A. Baker FISC 5/18/1998 – 5/18/2005 Jimmy Carter 
Stanley S. Brotman FISC 7/17/1997 – 5/18/2004 Gerald Ford 
William Stafford FISC 5/19/1996 – 5/18/2003 Gerald Ford 
Royce C. Lamberth FISC  5/19/1995 – 5/18/2002 Ronald Reagan 
Laurence Silberman FISCR 6/18/1996 – 5/18/2003 George W. Bush 
Paul Roney FISCR  9/13/1994 – 05/18/2001 Richard Nixon 
John F. Keenan FISC 7/27/1994 – 5/18/2001 Ronald Reagan 
James C. Cacheris FISC 9/10/1993 – 5/18/2000 Ronald Reagan 
Earl H. Carroll FISC 2/23/1993 – 5/18/1999 Jimmy Carter 
Charles Schwartz Jr. FISC 8/5/1992 – 5/18/1998 Gerald Ford 
Bobby Ray Baldock FISCR 6/17/1992 – 5/18/1998 Ronald Reagan 
Ralph G. Thompson FISC 6/11/1990 – 5/18/1997 Gerald Ford 
Frank Freedman FISC 5/30/1990 – 5/19/1994 Richard Nixon 
Wendell A. Miles FISC 9/21/1989 – 5/18/1996 Richard Nixon 
Robert W. Warren FISCR 10/30/1989 – 5/18/1996 Richard Nixon 
Sidney Aronovitz FISC 6/8/1989 – 5/18/1992 Gerald Ford 
Joyce H. Green FISC  5/18/1988 – 5/18/1995 Jimmy Carter 
Conrad K. Cyr FISC 5/18/1987 – 11/20/1989 Ronald Reagan 
Collins Seitz FISCR 3/19/1987 – 3/18/1994 Lyndon B. Johnson 
* Denotes current members of FISC       Figure 1 
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**Denotes current members of FISCR 
 
 
Augmenting the politicization of FISC and FISCR is the rather remarkable success rate 
enjoyed by the government in its applications to the court. Scholars have noted that it is 
“unparalleled in any other American court.”331  Much attention has been paid in this 
regard to the almost nonexistent rate of denial of orders under the electronic 
communications intercept authorities.  Almost no attention, however, has been paid to 
business records and the production of tangible goods under 50 U.S.C. §1862(c)(2)—the 
section most relevant to the metadata programs. Consistent with the restrictions, it 
appears that FISC has never denied an application for an order under this section.  That 
is, of 751 applications since 2005, all 751 have been granted. (See Fig. 2) 
 
ORDERS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE GOODS 
 
Year Number of Applications to FISC 
under 50 USC 1862(c)(2) 
Number of Applications 
Granted by FISC 
2005332 155 155 
2006333 43 43 
2007334 6 6 
2008335 13 13 
2009336 21 21 
2010337 96 96 
2011338 205 205 
2012339 212 212 
Figure 2 
 
These numbers are remarkable not least because any one order, as we have seen with the 
telephony metadata program, could result in the collection of millions of records on 
millions of U.S. persons.  In light of the utter lack of adversarial counsel in in camera, ex 
parte proceedings, these numbers at least raise serious question about the extent to which 
FISC and FISCR perform the function they were envisioned to serve. 
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Jr., President, United States Senate, Apr. 30, 2013, available at 
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VI.  BULK COLLECTION VIOLATES FISA’S STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 
The telephony metadata program violates the express statutory language in three primary 
areas: first, with regard to the language “relevant to an authorized investigation”; second, 
in relation to the requirement that the information sought can be obtained under subpoena 
duces tecum; and third, in its violation of the restrictions specifically placed on pen 
registers and trap and trace equipment. 
 
A.  “Relevant to an Authorized Investigation” 
The government argues that the NSA’s telephony metadata program is consistent with the 
language of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 in that all telephone calls in the United States, including 
those of a wholly local nature, are “relevant” to foreign intelligence investigations.   
The word itself, the administration states, “is a broad term that connotes anything 
‘[b]earing upon, connected with, [or] pertinent to’ a specified subject matter.  13 Oxford 
English Dictionary 561 (2d ed. 1989).”340 Turning to its “particularized legal meaning,” 
It is well-settled in the context of other forms of legal process for the production 
of documents that a documents is “relevant” to a particular subject matter not 
only where it directly bears on that subject matter, but also where it is reasonable 
to believe that it could lead to other information that directly bears on that subject 
matter.341 
The fact that massive amounts of data may be involved is of little import:  
Courts have held in the analogous contexts of civil discovery and criminal and 
administrative investigations that “relevance” is a broad standard that permits 
discovery of large volumes of data in circumstances where doing so is necessary 
to identify much smaller amounts of information within that data that directly 
bears on the matter being investigated.342 
Applied to the telephony metadata program, whilst recognizing that the telephony 
metadata program is “broad in scope”, the government argues that there are nevertheless 
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the category of data (i.e., all telephone call data), 
when queried and analyzed, “will produce information pertinent to FBI investigations of 
international terrorism.” 343   For communications data, the government argues, 
connections between individual data points can only be reliably identified through large-
scale data mining.344 
There are two sets of responses to the government’s arguments.  The first centers on 
the government’s claim that all telephony metadata is relevant to authorized 
investigations; the center revolves around the connection in the statutory language 
between the relevance of the information to be obtained and “an authorized 
investigation.” 
 
1. Relevance Standard 
The first problem with the government’s argument is that it stretches credulity to state 
that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that millions of daily telephone records are 
“relevant” to an authorized investigation.  
The records sought by the government under the telephony metadata program detail 
the interactions, personal and business relationships, religious and political connections, 	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and other intimate details – on a daily basis – of millions of Americans, not themselves 
connected in any way to foreign powers or agents thereof.  They include private and 
public interactions between Senators, between members of the House of Representatives, 
and between judges and their chambers, as well as information about state and local 
officials.  They include parents communicating with their children’s teachers, and 
zookeepers arranging for the care of animals.  Rape hotlines, abortion clinics, and 
political party headquarters—all telephony metadata data is being collected by the NSA. 
Reading FISA to allow this type of collection would render meaningless the 
qualifying phrases contained in 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(A).  The statute first requires that 
there be “reasonable grounds” to believe that the records being sought are relevant. 
Although FISA does not define “reasonable grounds”, it has been treated as the 
equivalent of “reasonable suspicion”.345  This standard requires a showing of “specific 
and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant” an intrusion into an individual’s right to privacy.346   
The FISC order requires that Verizon disclose all domestic telephone records—
including those of a purely local nature.  According to Verizon Communications News 
Center, as of last year, the company has 107.7 million wireless customers, connecting an 
average of 1 billion calls per day.347  There is simply no way that the government 
provided specific and articulable facts relevant to each one of those customers or calls, 
sufficient to establish reasonable grounds to establish their relevance.  Interpreting 
relevance as including all records is so broad as to make the “reasonable grounds” 
requirement obsolete.   
Precisely what, in turn, makes a tangible good “relevant” to an authorized 
investigation is not explained in the statute.  Nevertheless, the act suggests that tangible 
things are “presumptively relevant where they: “pertain to – (i) a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; (ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is 
the subject of such authorized investigation; or (iii) an individual in contact with, or 
known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized 
investigation.348 
This section also appears not to apply to the telephony metadata program. It would be 
impossible to establish that all customer and subscriber records pertain to a foreign power 
or an agent thereof, or to a particular, suspected agent of the same, who is the subject of 
an authorized investigation.  Perhaps five or ten customers may fall into this category, but 
millions simply pushes the bounds of common sense.  So the telephony metadata is 
neither relevant nor presumptively relevant. 
The government’s interpretation is so broad that it establishes a dangerous precedent.  
If all telephony metadata is relevant to foreign intelligence investigations, then so is all 
email metadata, and all GPS metadata, all financial information, all banking records, all 
social network participation, and all Internet use.  Indeed, FISC has hinted that there may 
be other programs at there that operate in a similar fashion, and on September 28, 2013, 
the New York Times reported that the NSA began allowing analysis of phone call and 
email logs in November 2010 to begin examining American’s networks of 
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347 Verizon Communications Company Statistics, reported by Verizon Communications News Center, Aug. 
10, 2012, available at http://www.statisticbrain.com/verizon-communications-company-statistics/. 
348 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
	   52 
associations.349  If all telephony metadata is relevant, then so is all other data—which 
means that very little would, in fact, be irrelevant to such investigations.  If this is the 
case, then such an interpretation radically undermines not just the limiting language in the 
statute, but the very purpose for FISA in the first place. 
Finally, the government’s interpretation directly contradicts Congress’ intent in 
adopting §215.  At the introduction of the measure Senator Arlen Specter explained that 
the purpose of the language was to create an incentive for the government to use the 
authority only when it could demonstrate a connection to a particular suspected terrorist 
or spy.350 During a House Judiciary Committee meeting on July 17, 2013, Representative 
James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), reiterated that the reason Congress inserted “relevant” into 
the statute was to ensure that only information directly related to national security probes 
would be included—not to authorize the ongoing collection of all phone calls placed and 
received by millions of Americans not suspected of any wrongdoing.351 Members of the 
Committee made similar claims.352  
 
2. Connection to “an Authorized Investigation” 
There are three ways, in turn, in which the telephony metadata program violates FISA’s 
requirement in §1861 that the order be sought for use in an “authorized investigation.” 
First, the guidelines establishing when such an investigation exists relate solely to the 
moment of the collection of the information.  The FISC order, in contrast, allows the 
collection of the data on an ongoing basis, tying instead the search of such information to 
authorized investigations.  Second, under the Attorney General guidelines, for each of the 
levels, there is a predicate specificity required prior to the collection of information—
namely, that the investigation be premised upon specific individuals, groups, or 
organizations, or violations of criminal law.  The telephony metadata program, in 
contrast, requires no such specificity prior to the collection of the data.  Third, the orders 
issued by FISC empower the NSA to conduct searches of the data in future authorized 
investigations.  In other words, the collection of the metadata is relevant to the concept of 
investigations generally.  This means that the orders do not, in fact, relate to (existing) 
authorized investigations. 
 
a. Collection of the Information 
FISA, as aforementioned, requires that the government submit a statement of facts 
demonstrating reasonable grounds to believe that the records being sought are relevant to 
an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment).353  It ties the definition of 
what constitutes an authorized investigation to guidelines approved by the Attorney 
General under Executive Order 12333.354  These guidelines establish three levels of 
investigative activity in national security investigations:  (1) threat assessments, (2) 
preliminary investigations, and (3) full investigations.355   
FISA makes it clear that the tangible records in question may not be sought as part of 
the first level of national security investigations—i.e., the threat assessment stage.  There 	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is an important reason for this restriction:  threat assessment is the most general level of 
an investigation.  It allows the FBI to collect information on individuals, groups, and 
organizations “of possible investigative interest, and information on possible targets of 
international terrorist activities or other national security threats.” 356   To protect 
individual rights, the only types of methods allowed, as noted by the Attorney General, 
are “relatively non-intrusive investigative techniques.”  This includes: 
obtaining publicly available information, accessing information available within 
the FBI or Department of Justice, requesting information from other government 
entities, using online informational resources and services, interviewing 
previously established assets, non-pretextual interviews and requests for 
information from members of the public and private entities, and accepting 
information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities.357 
Nowhere in the discussion of the threat assessment stage does the document contemplate 
the use of court-ordered surveillance. 
The guidelines go on to compare the authorization of the first level of investigations 
to authorization under Part VI of the Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes.  
These guidelines state that mail covers, mail openings, and nonconsensual electronic 
surveillance or any other investigative technique covered by Title 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2521 
shall not be used during a preliminary inquiry.358 
The point of these limits is to place a higher burden on the government to justify the 
use of more intrusive surveillance.  That is, if such information is going to be collected, 
there must be a higher burden of proof on the government to justify the collection of data.  
It is for this reason that what distinguishes the first level of threat assessment from the 
second level “preliminary investigation” is the type of information that can be obtained.  
It is thus the act of collecting it that characterizes the distinction between the different 
levels 
In contrast to the guidelines, the primary order authorizing the telephony metadata 
program authorizes the collection of data for 90-day periods, in the course of which the 
NSA may search the information in connection with an authorized investigation.   
The primary order is general—it states that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
not that the information is relevant to a particular investigation, but rather, in the plural, 
to “authorized investigations”.359  The idea is that the general collection of records may 
be relevant to any number of investigations.  This is precisely the government’s argument 
in its August 2013 white paper:  “there have been numerous FBI investigations in the last 
several years to which the telephony metadata records are relevant.”360  Under the 
guidelines, it is the collection of such information that is premised upon the existence of 
an authorized investigation—not the search of broad data in the course of the same. 
 
b.  Specificity 
For both preliminary investigations and full investigations, for which tangible items 
orders under FISA may be sought, there is a predicate specificity required prior to the 
collection of information—namely, that the investigation be premised upon specific 	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individuals, groups, or organizations, or violations of criminal law.  The telephony 
metadata program, in contrast, collects all call records. 
Under the Attorney General guidelines, preliminary investigations are authorized 
“when there is information or an allegation indicating that a threat to the national security 
may exist.”361  Such investigations are particular, in that they may relate to specific 
individuals, groups, and organizations.362  The guidelines state,  
Since the legal predicate for mail opening, physical searches, and electronic 
surveillance that require a judicial order or warrant generally entails more 
substantial information or evidence than would be available outside of a full 
investigation, the Guidelines specify that these methods are not available in 
preliminary investigations.363   
Pen registers and trap and trace devices may be used during preliminary investigations.364  
Such investigations are limited:  they are initially authorized for up to six months, subject 
to a possible six-month extension.  Extensions beyond a year must be authorized by FBI 
Headquarters.365 
Full investigations, in turn, require specific and articulable facts giving reason to 
believe that a threat to national security may exist.366  Like preliminary investigations, 
such inquiries as specific in that they may relate to individuals, groups, and 
organizations.367 
In contravention of the Attorney General Guidelines, the telephony metadata program 
collects data, using precisely those tools that are limited to preliminary and full 
investigations, outside of their actual scope.  
 
c.  Future Authorized Investigations 
Third, FISA contemplates the relevance of information to an investigation already in 
existence at the time the order is granted.  The language is very specific. Applications 
must include “a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation.”368 The word 
“are” before “relevant” suggests that at the time the records are being sought, their 
relevance to an investigation must be established.   
The orders issued by FISC depart from the statutory language, empowering the NSA 
to obtain the data in light of their relevance to “authorized investigations”—and requiring 
telecommunications companies to indefinitely provide such information in the future.369  
But how can the court know that all such telephony data will continue to be relevant to 
investigations that are not yet opened? Indeed, as noted by amici in In Re Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, Congress could have used any number of alternative 
auxiliary verbs—“such as ‘can’; ‘could’; ‘will’ or ‘might.’ But it chose not to do so.  
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Instead, Congress required relevance to an investigation existing at the time of the 
application.”370 
In addition, the information sought must be relevant “to an authorized investigation.”  
This is both singular (“an”) and past tense, in that is has already been “authorized.” The 
House Report that accompanied the first introduction of the business records provisions 
explained that the purpose of this language was to provide “for an application to the FISA 
court for an order directing the production of tangible items such as books, records, 
papers, documents and other items upon certification to the court that the records sought 
are relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence investigation.”371 How can the court with 
any certainty suggest that all investigations in the future will be authorized?   
The government’s argument, instead of centering on a particular investigation, 
appears to create a categorical exception for the collection of records.  Namely, it argues 
that when the government “has reason to believe that conducting a search of a broad 
collection of telephony metadata records will produce counterterrorism information”, 
“the standard of relevance under Section 215 is satisfied.”372  That is, it is the nature of 
the information extracted, not the prior existence of a directly related, authorized 
investigation, that is of moment.  Authorized investigations thus become merely a 
category for which the information is useful.373 
This interpretation directly contradicts Congressional intent.  Following the release of 
the Snowden documents, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, one of the principal 
authors of the USA PATRIOT Act, noted that in Section 215, “congress intended to 
allow the intelligence communities to access targeted information for specific 
investigations.  How can every call that every American makes or receives be relevant to 
a specific investigation?  This is well beyond what the Patriot Act allows.”374 
 
B.  Subpoena Duces Tecum 
The only express limit on the type of tangible item that can be subject to an order under 
50 U.S.C. §1861 is that it “can be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a 
court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order 
issued by a court of the United States directing the production of records or tangible 
things.”375  FISC, accordingly, took the position in its order authorizing the telephony 
metadata program that “The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena 
duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or 
with any other order issued by a court of the United States directing the production of 
records or tangible things.”376  The court later explained, “Call detail records satisfy this 
requirement, since they may be obtained by (among other means) a ‘court order for 
disclosure’ under 18 U.S.C.A. §2703(d). Section 2703(d) permits the government to 
obtain a court order for release of non-content records, or even in some cases of the 
contents of a communication, upon a demonstration of relevance to a criminal 
investigation.”377 	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A subpoena duces tecum is a writ or process used to command a witness to bring 
with him and produce to the court books, papers, &c., over which he has control and 
which help to elucidate the matter in issue.378 Unlike warrants, something less than 
probable cause is required.  The rationale behind this is that the purpose of the instrument 
is not to conduct a search absent a suspect’s consent, but, rather, to obtain documents and 
information that the prosecution has concluded will be material in a case.379   
The authority to issue a subpoena is not unlimited.  Under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, “the court. . . may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive.”380  Precisely what counts as reasonable (or not) is heavily 
context-dependent.381 In United States v. Nixon, the Court laid out a three-part test, 
requiring the Government to establish relevancy, admissibility, and specificity, in order to 
enforce a subpoena in the trial context.382   
The Nixon standard does not apply in the context of grand jury proceedings.383  In 
1991 the Court explained: 
Nixon’s multi-factor test would invite impermissible procedural delays and 
detours while courts evaluate the relevance and admissibility of documents 
sought by a particular subpoena.  Additionally, requiring the Government to 
explain in too much detail the particular reasons underlying a subpoena threatens 
to compromise the indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings.  Broad 
disclosure also affords the targets of investigation far more information about the 
grand jury’s workings than the Rules of Criminal Procedure appear to 
contemplate.384 
The Court went on to note that this does not mean that the grand jury’s investigatory 
powers are limitless.  To the contrary, it is still subject to Rule 17(c).  Nevertheless, grand 
jury subpoenas are given the benefit of the doubt, with the burden of showing 
unreasonableness on the recipient seeking to avoid compliance. 385   For claims of 
irrelevancy, motions to quash “must be denied unless the district court determines that 
there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will 
produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”386 
At the broadest level, then, FISC’s assertion, at least with regard to a grand jury 
subpoena, appears to be valid.  But there are three critical flaws in the court’s reasoning:  
first, subpoenas may not be used for fishing expeditions; second, they must be focused on 
specific individuals or alleged crimes prior to the collection of information; and third, the 
emphasis is on past wrongdoing—not on potential future relationships and actions.  In 
addition, remarkably, FISC has openly admitted that the telephony metadata order it 
issued violates the statutory language requiring that the information to be obtained 
comport with the requirements of a subpoena. 
 
1.  Not for Fishing Expeditions 
Even with such deference granted to subpoenas issued by grand juries, such instruments 
may not be used for fishing expeditions—i.e., enabling individuals to obtain massive 	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amounts of information whence evidence can be derived.387  That is to say, a grand jury 
could not convene in Bethesda, Maryland, and simply begin collecting telephony 
metadata, which it could subsequently mine to find evidence of criminal behavior.  
To the contrary, an investigator must have a reasonable suspicion that some 
document or communication exists, in order for the Court to order its production.  A 
general suspicion that collecting and analyzing all telephone records in the United States 
might yield some evidence of criminality is many steps removed from the prior suspicion 
of a particular act of criminality that characterizes grand jury subpoenas. 
Almost all of the telephony metadata collected is utterly unrelated to criminal 
activity.  In Judge Reggie Walton’s words, 
[N]early all of the call detail records collected pertain to communications of non-
U.S. persons who are not the subject of an FBI investigation to obtain foreign 
intelligence information, are communications of U.S. persons who are not the 
subject of an FBI investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities, and are data that otherwise could not be legally 
captured in bulk by the government.  Ordinarily, this alone would provide 
sufficient grounds for a FISC judge to deny the application.388 
Precisely because the information is not connected, in any way, to criminal activity, 
Walton suggests that it could not, in any other way, even be collected. 
While new technologies may change what is possible in terms of the amount of 
records obtained or the level of insight that can be gleaned, they do not invalidate the 
underlying principle.  In a world limited by the physical manifestation of evidence, 
practicality helped to cabin the scope of subpoenas. Digitization, however, does not alter 
the importance of tying the compulsion of evidence directly to an underlying crime. 
 
2. Specificity 
Grand jury investigations are specific.  That is, they represent investigations into 
particular individuals, or particular entities, in relation to which there is reasonable 
suspicion that some illegal behavior has occurred.  The compelled production of records 
or items is thus limited by reference to the target of the investigation.   
If a grand jury were, for instance, focused on the potentially criminal acts of the head 
of a crime family in New York, absent reasonable suspicion of some sort of connection to 
the syndicate, it would not issue a subpoena for the telephone records of the Parent-
Teacher’s Association at Briarwood School in Santa Clara, California.   
In contrast, the Section 215 orders are broad and non-specific.  That is, on the basis 
of no particular suspicion, all call records, the “vast majority” of which (according to 
FISC’s own language) are of a purely local nature, are swept up by the NSA.389 
 
3.  Past Crimes 
Grand jury investigations are also retroactive, searching for evidence of a past crime.  
The telephony metadata orders, in contrast, are both past and forward-looking, in that 
they anticipate the possibility of illegal behavior in the future.  Most of the individuals in 
the database are suspected of no wrongdoing whatsoever.  Yet the minimization 	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procedures allow for any information obtained from mining the data to then be used in 
criminal prosecution. This is an unprecedented use of subpoena information-gathering 
authority.  It amounts to a permanent, ongoing grand jury investigation into all, possible, 
future criminal acts. 
 
4.  March 2009 FISC Opinion  
FISC has openly recognized that the information it obtains from the metadata program 
could not otherwise be collected with any other legal instrument—including a subpoena 
duces tecum.  In a secret opinion in March 2009 Judge Reggie Walton wrote: 
Because the collection would result in NSA collecting call detail records 
pertaining to [REDACTED] of telephone communications, including call detail 
records pertaining to communications of United States (U.S.) persons located 
within the U.S. who are not the subject of any FBI investigation and whose 
metadata could not otherwise be legally captured in bulk, the government 
proposed stringent minimization procedures that strictly controlled the 
acquisition, accessing, dissemination, and retention of these records by the NSA 
and FBI.390 
Later in the document, he again noted that the information “otherwise could not be 
legally captured in bulk by the government”.391   
This assertion directly contradicts the statutory requirement that the information 
could otherwise be obtained via subpoena duces tecum.  It amounts to an admission, by 
the Court, that the program violated the statute. 
What makes the failure of the Court to prevent the illegal program from continuing 
even more concerning, perhaps, is Judge Walton’s explanation of why, even though the 
information could not legally be obtained in any other way, FISC allowed the 
government to proceed.  He continues, 
Nevertheless, the FISC has authorized the bulk collection of call detail records in 
this case based upon: (1) the government’s explanation, under oath, of how the 
collection of and access to such data are necessary to analytical methods that are 
vital to the national security of the United States; and (2) minimization 
procedures that carefully restrict access to the BR metadata and includes specific 
oversight requirements.392 
In other words, FISC allowed an illegal program to operate because the government (1) 
promised that it was vital to U.S. national security, and (2) was directed by the court to 
police its own house by following the minimization procedures.  The former is a flimsy 
excuse for allowing the executive branch to break the law.  The latter highlights the 
extent to which the Court, precisely because of the size of the collection program in 
question, was dependent on the NSA:  “in light of the scale of this bulk collection 
program, the Court must rely heavily on the government to monitor this program to 
ensure that it continues to be justified. . . and that it is being implemented in a manner 
that protects the privacy interests of U.S. persons.”393 
Returning to the earlier point, in relation to FISC’s abdication of its responsibilities:  
it was to protect U.S. persons’ privacy interests that FISC was created in the first place.  
Congress did not anticipate that FISC would simply hand over this responsibility to the 	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NSA, once the NSA requested such a sweeping surveillance program that FISC lost the 
ability to conduct oversight. 
 
C.  Evisceration of Pen/Trap Provisions 
All of the  information obtained through the telephony metadata program is provided for 
in FISA’s pen register and trap and trace provisions.  In contrast to the process followed 
by the government with regard to section 215, however, the pen/trap provisions require 
prior targeting and limited collection of information.  The use of second 215 to obtain 
seemingly limitless information amounts to an end-run around the pen/trap provisions. 
 
D.  Potential Violation of Other Provisions of Criminal Law 
There are, in addition, other statutory provisions that raise question about the legality of 
the current telephony metadata program.  Namely, in December 2008 FISC issued a 
Supplemental Opinion, noting the Court’s reasons for concluding that the records to be 
produced pursuant to the telephony metadata orders were properly subject to production 
under 50 U.S.C. §1861.394  The reason behind the document appears to be that although 
such orders were previously approved, for the first time the government cited 18 
U.S.C.A. has identified the provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. §§2702-2703 as relevant to the 
question. 
Under 50 U.S.C. §1861, Congress empowered the government to apply to the FISC 
“for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, 
papers, documents, and other items.”395  The Court placed special emphasis on the use of 
the word “any”, suggesting that it “naturally connotes ‘an expansive meaning,’ extending 
to all members of a common set, unless Congress employed ‘language limiting [its] 
breadth.”396 
The Court had apparently considered “any” to be without limit, until 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§2702-2703 was brought to its attention.  This statute laid out an apparently exhaustive 
set of circumstances under which telephone service providers could provide customer or 
subscriber records to the government.397  An order under 50 U.S.C. §1861 was not 
included in this list.  At the same time that Congress had passed Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, moreover, it had amended sections 2702 and 2703 in ways that appeared 
to re-affirm that communications service providers could only divulge records to the 
government in particular circumstances—without specifically noting FISC orders.398 	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governmental entity” proceeds according to one of the potential routes laid out in §2703(c)(1)(A)-(E) 
(2013)). 
398 In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Supplemental Opinion, No. BR 08-13, at 3 
(FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Dec%2012%202008%20Supplemental%20Opinions%20fro
m%20the%20FISC.pdf. 
	   60 
Judge Reggie Walton reconciled this tension in a most curious manner.  He pointed 
to National Security Letters—a completely different form of subpoena (i.e., an 
administrative subpoena), noting that Congress, in the USA PATRIOT Act, empowered 
the FBI, without prior judicial review, to compel a telephone service provider to produce 
“subscriber information and toll billing records information”, on the basis of FBI 
certification of relevance to an authorized foreign intelligence investigation.399  Judge 
Walton pointed to the heightened requirements of §1861, i.e., that the government 
provide a “statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
tangible things sought are relevant” to a foreign intelligence investigation, and that FISC 
determine that the application is sufficient.  He then noted that §2703(c)(2) expressly 
permits the government to use administrative subpoenas to obtain certain categories of 
non-content information from a provider—and concluded that, surely, Congress could not 
have intended a higher standard for FISC orders. 
The problem, of course, with his reasoning is that despite the precision of 18 U.S.C. 
§§2702-2703, and the concurrent amendment of these sections with the introduction of 
USA PATRIOT Act §215, Congress nowhere includes in the language of 18 USC 
§§2703-2703 provision for FISC orders as an exception to the closed set.  Instead, it 
allows the provision of telephony metadata to the government only in two cases:  first, 
when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or 
State statute; or, second, when a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena issues.400  
The next paragraph, moreover, ties the provision directly to the actual commission of a 
crime. A court order for disclosure under §2703(c) may only be issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction where the government can provide “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that. . . the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”401  
The types of records being sought by the FBI from FISC, in contrast, extended well 
beyond records either relevant or material to an ongoing criminal investigation.  
Furthermore, under 18 USC §2703(d), the judiciary is empowered to quash or modify 
such orders where the records being requested “are unusually voluminous in nature.”402  
It would be difficult to imagine any telephony metadata database more voluminous than 
one collecting all call data in the United States.  As such, the statute contemplates yet 
further limits on the collection of information. 
 
VI.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The government argues that the telephony metadata collection program complies with the 
Constitution.403  In doing so, it relies on Smith v. Maryland, in which the court held that 
participants in telephone calls lack a reasonable expectation of privacy (for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment) in the telephone numbers dialed and received on one’s phone.  
The government also argues that the national security interests at stake override whatever 
privacy intrusion arises from the bulk collection of telephony metadata.404   These 
arguments are problematic.   
The telephony metadata program amounts to a general warrant, the prohibition of 
which gave rise to the Fourth Amendment.  Reliance on Smith v. Maryland, moreover is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(a) (2006). 
400 Id. at §2703(c)(2). 
401 Id. at §2703(d). 
402 Id. 
403 See Section 215 White Paper, supra note 223, at 3.  
404 Id. 
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misplaced: the case involved individualized, reasonable cause to believe that the target of 
the pen register had engaged in criminal behavior and threatening and obscene conduct. 
The placement of the pen register was obtained via consent. Significant technological and 
societal changes in the interim further render the third party doctrine a moot point. While 
lower courts might follow the Third Party Doctrine, the Supreme Court appears poised to 
recognize exceptions in light of modern interaction. 
 
A.  The Fourth Amendment Prohibition on General Warrants 
At the time of the founding, English courts rejected general warrants. A different 
standard, however, marked the crown’s treatment of the American colonies.  This 
angered the colonists, who saw themselves, first and foremost, as Englishmen—and 
therefore deserving of all the rights and privileges accorded to English subjects.  
Perhaps the most famous case establishing the right of Englishmen to be free of a 
general writ dates from November 1762, when King George III’s messengers broke into a 
man’s home to execute a warrant issued by the Secretary of State.405  The warrant 
empowered the king’s men “to make strict and diligent search for . . . the author, or one 
concerned in the writing of several weekly very seditious papers.”406  The men, who 
searched John Entick’s home for four hours without his consent and against his will 
“broke open, and read over, pried into and examined all [of his] private papers [and] 
books.”407 Upon departure, the men seized Entick’s documents, charts, pamphlets, and 
other materials.408  
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Charles Pratt, First Earl Camden, ruled that both 
the search and the seizure was unlawful. He explained: 
Suppose a warrant which is against law be granted, such as no justice of peace, or 
other magistrate high or low whomsoever, has power to issue, whether that 
magistrate or justice who grants such warrant, or the officer who executes it, are 
within the [statute] 24 Geo. 2, c. 44? To put one case. . . suppose a justice of 
peace issues a warrant to search a house for stolen goods, and directs it to four of 
his servants, who search and find no stolen goods, but seize all the books and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765).  
406 The full warrant read:   
George Montagu Dunk, earl of Halifax, viscount Sunbury, and baron Halifax one of the 
lords of his majesty’s honourable [sic.] privy council, lieutenant general of his majesty’s 
forces, lord lieutenant general and general governor of the kingdom of Ireland, and 
principal secretary of state, etc. these are in his majesty’s name to authorize and require 
you, taking a constable to your assistance, to make strict and diligent search for John 
Entick, the author, or one concerned in writing of several weekly very seditious papers, 
entitled the Monitor, or British Freeholder, No 357, 358, 360, 373, 376, 378, 379, and 
380, London, printed for J. Wilson and J. Fell in Pater Noster Row, which contains gross 
and scandalous reflections and invectives upon his majesty’s government, and upon both 
houses of parliament; and him, having found you are to seize and apprehend, and to 
bring, together with his books and papers, in safe custody before me to be examined 
concerning the premisses, and further dealt with according to law; in the due execution 
whereof all mayors, sheriffs, justices of the peace, constables, and other majesty’s 
officers and military, and all loving subjects whom it may concern, are to be aiding and 
assisting to you as there shall be occasion; and for so doing this shall be your warrant. 
Given at St. James’s the 6th day of November 1762, in the third year of his majesty’s 
reign, Dunk Halifax. To Nathan Carrington, James Watson, Thomas Ardran, and Robert 
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papers of the owners of the house, whether in such a case would the justice of 
peace, his officers or servants, be within the [statute]?409 
Two aspects to the case proved particularly troubling: first, the writ had empowered the 
crown to seize all documents—not just those of a criminal nature; and, second, no 
demonstration had been made prior to the search and seizure, establishing the probability 
that Entick was engaged in criminal activity: 
The warrant in our case was an execution. . . without any previous summons, 
examination, hearing the plaintiff, or proof that he was the author of the supposed 
libels; a power claimed by no other magistrate whatever. . . it was left to the 
discretion of these defendants to execute the warrant in the absence or presence 
of the plaintiff, when he might have no witness present to see what they did; for 
they were to seize all papers, bank bills, or any other valuable papers they might 
take away if they were so disposed; there might be nobody to detect them.410 
The court suggested that since the Glorious Revolution and the restoration of William 
and Mary to the throne, such powers had been denied to the crown. It was precisely such 
aggrandizement of power that had led to revolution in the first place.  The Chief Justice 
stated “we can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what 
they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society; for papers are 
often the dearest property a man can have.”411  The Court flatly rejected the use of such 
general warrants. 
The use of writs of assistance played a central role in lending speed to the American 
Revolution. Acting under writs established by Parliamentary statute, officers of the crown 
had permission to search the homes, papers, and belongings of any person.412  As early as 
1660 legislation to prevent Fraudes and Concealments of His Majestyes Customes and 
Subsidyes empowered magistrates to: 
[I]ssue out a Warrant to any person or persons thereby enableing him or them 
with the assistance of a Sheriffe Justice of the Peace or Constable to enter into 
any House in the day time where such Goods are suspected to be concealed, and 
in case of resistance to breake open such Houses and to seize and secure the same 
goods soe concealed, and all Officers and Ministers of Justice are hereby 
required to be aiding and assisting thereunto.413 
The writs came to be seen as the worst instrument of arbitrary power, turning colonists 
against the crown. 
Their use was part of a general crack-down engineered by British Prime Minister 
William Pitt, who directed the American colonial governors and royal customs officers to 
more strictly enforce trade and navigation laws –specifically, to “make the strictedst [sic.] 
and most diligent [sic.] Enquiry into the State of this dangerous and ignominious Trade.”  




412 Officials could “enter and go into any House, Warehouse, Shop, Cellar, or other Place” to seize goods.  
M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 1 (1978) (quoting a 1767 measure by Parliament, establishing a 
new writ of assistance in America). 
413 An Act to Prevent Fraudes and Concealments of His Majestyes Customes and Subsidyes, 12 Car. II, c. 19 
(1660).  See also Act for Preventing Fraudes and Regulating Abuses in his Majesties Customes, 14 Car. II, c. 
11 (1662).  A good discussion of the early writs of assistance is located in Joseph R. Frese, EARLY 
PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION ON WRITS OF ASSISTANCE, PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS (1959). 
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He ordered that every step authorized by law be taken “to bring all such heinous 
Offenders to the most exemplary and condign [sic.] Punishment.”414   
In response to Pitt’s order, the governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony began making 
use of the writ, prompting Boston merchants to hire James Otis to challenge their 
constitutionality.  In what has become one of the most famous examples of early 
American legal oration, Otis argued that the writs were contrary to “the fundamental 
principles of law”.  Scholars hail Otis’ argument in the case as helping “to lay the 
foundation for the breach between Great Britain and her continental colonies.”415  As A.J. 
Langguth observed, at the Writs of Assistance trial, “James Otis stood up to speak, and 
something profound changed in America.”416 
One of our best accounts of Paxton’s Case comes from John Adams, who was present 
at the argument and whose mentor, Jeremiah Grindley, the most distinguished member of 
the bar in Boston, opened the case for the crown.417 In replying to Grindley, Otis stated 
that his efforts were being made “out of regard to the liberties of the subject.”  The rights 
of British subjects were under assault, compelling him to oppose “all such instruments of 
slavery on the one hand and villainy on the other as this Writ of Assistance is.”   
For Otis, the writ was “the worst instrument of arbitrary power.”  He ignored the 
crown’s claim of necessity—and current practice—noting that “the writ prayed for in this 
petition, being general, is illegal.”  He highlighted four concerns:  first, it was universal—
i.e., it could be executed by anyone in possession with it; second, it was perpetual in that 
it indefinitely allowed the holder of the writ to conduct searches; third, no prior evidence 
of wrongdoing need be involved in its execution; and fourth, there was no requirement to 
swear to suspicion of wrongdoing or, following execution, to inquire into its exercise.  
“One of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one’s house,” 
Otis opined.  General warrants would annihilate the privilege associated with that right.418   
Although the court ruled against Otis, John Adams later wrote that his arguments 
“breathed into this nation the breath of life.”419 Indeed, on June 12, 1776 the Virginia 
Constitutional Convention adopted the Virginia Declaration of Rights—a document that 
deeply influenced the Declaration of Independence, as well as other states’ constitutions, 
and became the basis for the Bill of Rights—without which, the Constitution would never 
have been ratified.  
The Virginia Declaration of Rights stated, inter alia, “That general warrants, whereby 
an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence 
of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not 
particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought 
not to be granted.”420 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 similarly objected to the 
use of general warrants: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Horace Gray, Writs of Assistance in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772 
407-08 ( Samuel M. Quincy ed. (1865). 
415 LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION, 1763-1777 39 (1954). 
416 A.J. LANGGUTH, PATRIOTS: THE MEN WHO STARTED THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22 1998.  For excellent 
studies of the case Otis argued see Gray, supra note 414, at 395-511; M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 
CASE (1978); James M. Farrell, The Child Independence is Born:  James Otis and Writs of Assistance in 
RHETORIC, INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONHOOD, Stephen E. Lucas ed., Vol. 2 of A Rhetorical History of the 
United States:  Significant Moments in American Public Discourse (Martin J. Medhurst ed.). 
417 Farrell, supra note 416, at 16.  See also Paxton’s Case of the Writ of Assistance in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., 
REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772 ( Samuel M. Quincy ed. (1865) 
418 Otis’ speech is taken from L. KINVIN WROTH & HILLER B. ZOBEL, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS VOL. 2 
139-144 (1965).  See also discussion in Farrell, supra note 416,  at 19-22. 
419 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS VOL. X. 276. 
420 Va. Decl. of Rights § 10. 
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Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures 
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.  All warrants, 
therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not 
previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in the warrant to a 
civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more 
suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant 
ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the 
laws.421 
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 lifted the clause almost verbatim.422  The 
Virginia ratifying convention of 1788 made a point to ensure that the subsequent 
Constitution would incliude a provision affirming that “every freeman has a right to be 
secure from all unreasonable searches and siezures of his person, his papers and his 
property.”423   New York, in turn, required nearly identical language, as did North 
Carolina—even as Virginia, New York and North Carolina all condemned overbroad 
warrants as “‘therefore’ unreasonable—‘grievous,’ ‘oppressive, and ‘dangerous.’”424 
Consistent with these states’ understandings, James Madison’s first draft of the Fourth 
Amendment addressed the right of the people “to be secured in their persons, their houses, 
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures.”425 
Madison understood the clause as a ban against general warrants.426 
In 1886 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the writs and the Founders’ 
rejection of the same as encapsulated in the Fourth Amendment: 
In order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth 
Amendment ot the Constitution under the terms “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of 
the controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England.  The 
practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue 
officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for 
smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced “the worst instrument of 
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundmental 
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book;” since they placed 
“the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”  This was in 
February, 1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV. 
422 New Hampshire Const. 1784, Art. XIX.  
Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his 
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are 
contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by 
oath, or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in 
suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be 
not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or 
seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities 
prescribed by the laws. 
Id. 
423 EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 184 (1957), quoted in Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 53, 68 (1996). 
424 Id., at 184, 191, 200-01, quoted and cited in Amar, supra note 423, at 68. 
425 Id., at 207, quoted in Amar, supra note 423, at 68. (emphasis added).  Note that the historical antecedent 
suggests a broad reading of the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” language of the Fourth Amendment. 
426 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV., 547, 555 (1999).  See 
also N. Lasson, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 103 (1937); Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement – The Burger Court Approach, 53 UNIV. 
OF COLORADO L. REV. 691, 692 (1982). 
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perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the 
colonies to the oppressions of the mother country.  “Then and there,” said John 
Adams, “then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the 
arbitrary claims of Great Britain.  Then and there the child Idependence was 
born.427 
The Court acknowledged the importance of Lord Camden’s decision in Entick v. 
Carrington, saying, 
[Camden’s] great judgment on that occasion is considered as one of the 
landmarks of English liberty.  It was welcomed and applauded by the lovers of 
liberty in the colonies, as well as in the mother country.  It is regarded as one of 
the permanent monuments of th eBritish Constitution, and is quoted as such by 
the English authorities on that subject down to the present time.428   
It was precisely general warrants that the Framers meant when referring to unreasonable 
searches and seizures.429 
The Supreme Court has continued, throughout U.S. history, to recognize the special 
role played by general warrants and writs of assistance in shaping the contours of the 
Fourth Amendment.  In 1980 the Court recognized that it is “familiar history that 
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ 
were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment.”430  General warrants were presumptively unreasonable. To drive the point 
home, the first Congress, which started out with just one sentence outlawing 
unreasonable search and seizure, went on to add a second clause to the Fourth 
Amendment, requiring that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause—ensuring in 
the process that government officials could not issue general warrants and still comport 
with the Fourth Amendment. 
Consistent with this reading, Professor Akhil Amar, inquiring as to what the warrant 
clause means—and what the relationship is between it and the earlier reasonableness 
clause—suggests that “broad warrants—warrants that fail to meet the various 
specifications of clause two—are inherently unreasonable under clause one.”431  Such a 
general warrant would immunize the officer who carried it out from a subsequent trespass 
suit.432  In the case of Entick v. Carrington, “Armed with sweeping warrants issued by 
executive officials, various govenrment henchmen broke into Englishmen’s houses, 
searched their papers, arrested their persons, and rummaged through their effects, in 
hopes of finding” wrongdoing.433   
Professor Thomas Davies similarly recognizes that “[t]he historical statements about 
search and seizure” in the fourth Amendment “focused on condemning general warrants.  
In fact, the historical concerns were almost exclusively about the need to ban house 
searches under general warrants.”434  Evidence suggests that “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” was a proxy for “the inherent illegality of any searches or seizures that might be 
made under general warrants.”435   Davies posits that the reason the Framers even 
bothered “to adopt constitutional bans against general warrants in light of the apparent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886). 
428 Id. at 626. 
429 Id. at 627. 
430 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). 
431 See Amar, supra note 423, at 60.  
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consensus that the general warrant was illegal at common law” was because of genuine 
concern that Congress might edanger the right in the future.436 
The FISC Order authorizing the telephony metadata program is, precisely, a general 
warrant. It authorizes the government to rummage through our papers and effects in the 
hope of finding wrongdoing. There is no previous suspicion of criminal activitiy. FISC 
admits that almost none of the information obtained relates to illegal behavior.  
It matters little whether one stores ones papers in a filing cabinet in one’s den, or 
places all financial documents on the iCloud—the digital equivalent, in modern times, of 
a filing cabinet.  Sheer volume of information requires individuals to arrange for storage 
of everything from medical records to family photos.  Email, in turn, holds our 
correspondence—papers that we place on a server with a company with whom we have a 
contractual relationship.  Banking records may be accessible over the Internet.   
This is our modern day equivalent of the papers and effects held by Entick in his 
home, and allowing the govenrment to obtain records of all of this information is the 
equivalent of a digital trespass on our private lives.437 The trespass in which the NSA is 
engaging is not supported by probable cause, it is not even supported by reasonable 
suspicion—indeed, no suspicion of any wrongdoing whatsoever is contemplated by the 
collection of myriad records of all U.S. persons.  It is the equivalent of a general warrant 
and, as such, is odius to the Fourth Amendment. 
 
B.  Third Party Data 
In defending the telephony metadata program, the government relies on the Court’s 
construction of a reasonable expectation of privacy in Katz v. United States (1967) and 
argues that, consistent with Smith v. Maryland (1979) third party information is not 
constitutionally-protected. This argument fails to appreciate the fact pattern in Smith v. 
Maryland, the evolution of technology, and the manner in which society now operates. It 
also ignores that the shadow majority in U.S. v. Jones (2012), that suggests that the 
Supreme Court is moving to recognize the world in which we now live and to re-evaluate 
the level of protection afforded, consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 
In 1967 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.438  Justice Potter Stewart, writing for Court, explained, “What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”439   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Id., at 657. 
437 Lord Camden explained in Entick v. Carrington:  
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a 
trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to 
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The government suggests that a Section 215 order is not a “search” as to any person 
because the Supreme Court “has expressly held, participants in telephone calls lack any 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the telephone numbers 
dialed.”440  In the case in question, Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that a pen register 
placed on a telephone line did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, because persons making phone calls do not have a reasonable expectation 
that the numbers they dial will remain private.441  The key sentence from the decision 
centered on the customer’s relationship with the telephone company:  namely “a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”442  The government argues: 
Although the telephony metadata obtained through Section 215 includes, in 
addition to the numbers dialed, the length and time of the calls and other similar 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information, under the reasoning 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Smith, there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in such information, which is routinely collected by telecommunications 
service providers for billing and fraud detection purposes.443 
For the government, the breadth of the program does not convert the collection of bulk 
data into a search.444  Further, the government argues that even if it were a search, it 
would still satisfy the reasonableness standard established by the Supreme Court to 
govern large-scale, but minimally intrusive suspicionless searches. Of particular 
importance here is the overriding government interest in protecting national security.445 
The problem with the government’s argument is that it glosses over some glaring 
differences between the bulk collection program and the facts of Smith v. Maryland.  On 
March 5, 1976, Ms. Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland. After 
giving the police a description of the robber and a 1975 Monte Carlo she had seen near 
the scene of the crime, she started receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a 
man who identified himself as the robber.  At one point, the caller asked her to go out in 
front of her house. When she did so, she saw the 1975 Monte Carlo moving slowly past 
her home.  On March 16, the police observed a car of the same description in her 
neighborhood.  Tracing the license plate, police discovered that the car was registered to 
Michael Lee Smith.446 
The following day, the police asked the telephone company to install a pen register to 
trace the numbers called from Smith’s home telephone.  The company agreed, and that 
day Smith called Patricia McDonough’s home.  On the basis of this and other 
information, the police applied for and obtained a search warrant.  Upon executing the 
warrant, police found a telephone book in Smith’s home, with the corner turned down to 
Patricia McDonough’s name and number.  In a subsequent six-man lineup, McDonough 
identified Smith as the person who robbed her.447 	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Although the police did not obtain a warrant prior to placing the pen register, at a 
minimum, reasonable suspicion had been established that the target of the surveillance, 
Michael Lee Smith, had robbed, threatened, intimidated, and harassed Patricia 
McDonough.  The police, accordingly, placed the pen register consistent with their 
reasonable suspicion that Michael Lee Smith was engaged in criminal wrongdoing. 
The telephony metadata program is an entirely different situation. The NSA is 
engaging in bulk collection absent any reasonable suspicion that the individuals, whose 
telephone information is being collected, are engaged in any wrongdoing. To the 
contrary, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court acknowledges that almost all of the 
information thus obtained will bear no relationship whatsoever to criminal activity.  The 
government, however, wants to place a pen register and trap and trace on all U.S. 
persons—essentially treating everyone in the United States as though they are Michael 
Lee Smith.  
In Smith v. Maryland, moreover, the police wanted only to record the numbers dialed 
from the suspect’s telephone.  Although it is now often forgotten, at the time the case was 
decided, telephone companies were treated as utilities, with local telephone calls billed by 
the minute.  What was unique about the technology involved in the pen register was that 
it could both identify and record the numbers dialed from a telephone—a function that 
the phone company itself did not have. 
In contrast, the bulk collection program now collects the numbers dialed, the 
numbers who call a particular number, trunk information, session times, and the like.  
And it has the ability to do that for not just one person, but for the entire country. 
Whereas the police in 1979 were concerned with whether Michael Lee Smith was calling 
a particular number, the NSA metadata program now collects all numbers called—in the 
process obtaining significant amounts of information about individuals.  Calls to a rape 
crisis line, an abortion clinic, a suicide hotline, or a political party headquarters reveal 
significantly more information than what was being sought in Smith. The sheer amount of 
information available is thus significantly different from what was at stake in the pen 
register placed on Michael Lee Smith’s line. 
Further characteristics distinguish the case.  In 1979, the telephone company 
consented to placing the pen register on the line.  Today, however, under the FISC order, 
telephone service providers are forced to comply with the government’s request. Unlike 
the voluntary behavior that marked the case, the bulk collection program relies on 
coercive government power to obtain records on all telephone subscribers. And it is not 
for a limited time.  In Smith v. Maryland, the police sought the information for an 
extremely limited period. The bulk metadata collection program has been operating for 
seven years now—and, the NSA argues—should be a permanent part of the government 
surveillance program. 
Perhaps the most important difference between the two situations lies in the realms of 
technology and social construction. The extent to which we rely on electronic 
communications to conduct our daily lives is of a fundamentally different scale and 
complexity than the situation that existed at the time the Court heard arguments in Smith.  
Resultantly, the extent of information that can be learned about not just individuals, but 
neighborhoods, school boards, political parties, girl scout troops—indeed, any social, 
political, or economic network, is light years ahead of what the Court contemplated in 
1979.  The logic of the government’s position has virtually no limit.  Not only is 
telephony metadata more revealing than previously, but all forms of metadata are at 
stake. 
Americans have a contractual relationship with myriad corporate entities now, to 
whom they have entrusted parts of their lives, such as friendships, corespondence, buying 
patterns, and financial records. Creating a contractual relationship with Safeway, 
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however, to gain access to reduced prices for food, is something different in kind than 
giving all information to the federal government. Americans reasonably expect that their 
movements, communications, and decisions will not be recorded and analyzed by the 
intelligence agencies.  And a majority of the Supreme Court seems to agree.   
In 2012 the Court considered a case involving 28-day surveillance. The government 
had obtained a search warrant permitting it to place a Global-Positioning System (GPS) 
tracking device on a car registered to the wife of a suspected drug dealer.  The day after 
the warrant expired, agents installed the device and followed the car’s movements for 
nearly a month.  Information thus obtained allowed the government to indict Antoine 
Jones and others on drug trafficking conspiracy charges.448  The Supreme Court held that 
attaching the GPS device to the car and tracing its movements amounted to a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.449  
This case is important for determining the constitutionality of the telephony metadata 
program in two important ways.  First, it recognized that Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy test did not supplant the rights in existence at the time the Fourth Amendment 
was forged. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, explained: 
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government 
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.  
We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.450 
Justice Scalia cited Entick v. Carrington, noting that the Court had previously described it 
as a “‘monument of English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American 
statesman’ at the time the constitution was adopted, and considered to be ‘the true and 
ultimate expression of constitutional law’ with regard to search and seizure.”451 For 
Justice Scalia, and for the Court, the reasonable expectation of privacy test was of no 
consequence: “At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy 
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”452 
Just as the Court eschewed the test in Katz v. United States as being inapposite for 
consideration of the rights that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, it 
would be equally inapposite to dismiss the Fourth Amendment’s rejection of general 
warrants. “[A]t a minimum,” Justice Scalia wrote, the “18th century guarantee against 
unreasonable searches. . . . must provide. . . the degree of protection it afforded when it 
was adopted.”453 
The concept of a general warrant, and the Court’s conception of the tort of trespass, 
are, as previously noted, historically connected. The reason that general warrants were 
rejected at the time of the Founding was because they provided a carte blanche to the 
government to trespass at will upon one’s property and to search through ones papers and 
effects without any reasonable suspicion. 
The second point to draw out of Jones is that what can be considered a shadow 
majority appears to recognize that changed circumstances exist, so as to augment the 
need for new protections for privacy.  At least five justices indicated unease with the 
intrusiveness of modern technology in light of changed times, offering in the process 
different aspects of a mosaic theory of privacy. 
Even though he adopted Katz as the relevant standard, Justice Samuel Alito, joined 
by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan, suggested that in most criminal 	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investigations, long-term monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy.”  New 
technologies mattered: 
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit the 
monitoring of a person’s movements.  In some locales, closed-circuit television 
video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous.  On toll roads, automatic toll collection 
systems create a precise record of the movements of motorists who choose to 
make use of their convenience.  Many motorists purchase cars that are equipped 
with devices that permit a central station to ascertain the car’s location at any 
time so that roadside assistance may be provided if needed and the car may be 
found if it is stolen.454 
Unlike in the past, the daily business of living one’s life creates a digital record with 
privacy implications.  “Perhaps most significant,” Justice Alito added, “cell phones and 
other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record the location of 
users—and as of June 2011, it has been reported, there were more than 322 million 
wireless devices in use in the United States.”455  Before computers, practicality proved 
one of the greatest protectors of individual privacy. It was difficult and expensive to 
conduct long-term surveillance. But technology has changed the equation. The 
government now is more able to engage in long-term surveillance; but while relatively 
short-term monitoring of individuals’ movements in public space might be consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment, “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”456 
Justice Sotomayor went one step further. She suggested that, in light of the level of 
intrusiveness represented by modern technology, “it may be necessary to reconsider the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” 457 She pointed out: 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal 
of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.  People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to the 
cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which 
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and 
medications they purchase to online retailers.458 
Justice Sotomayor added, “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed 
to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.”459 
 
VIII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Act sought to empower the NSA and others to take 
advantage of new technologies and to engage in necessary foreign intelligence gathering, 
while preventing the intelligence community from engaging in sweeping surveillance of 
U.S. citizens.  Congress enacted a series of restrictions, requiring that the target of such 
surveillance be a foreign power, or an agent thereof, insisting that probable cause support 
such claims, and heightening the protections afforded to the domestic collection of U.S. 
citizens’ information.  FISA’s expansion gradually brought physical searches, pen 
registers and trap and trace devices, as well as business records and tangible goods, 	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within its remit. These new authorities retained much of the structure that defined the 
statute. 
The NSA’s bulk collection of metadata contradicts the general approach adopted 
by Congress in enacting FISA.  The FISC orders lack the particularization required prior 
to the acquisition of information and the role FISC now plays departs from that 
envisioned by Congress.  The bulk collection program, moreover, violates the statutory 
language in at least three ways: it does not comport with the requirement that the tangible 
goods sought “are relevant to an authorized investigation”; it violates the requirement that 
the information be otherwise obtainable via subpoena duces tecum; and it bypasses the 
statutory provisions governing pen registers and trap and trace devices. Compounding the 
illegality of the program are serious constitutional concerns. The FISC order governing 
the telephony metadata program amounts to a general warrant, which the Fourth 
Amendment precludes. Efforts by the government to save the program on grounds of 
third party doctrine are unpersuasive in light of the unique circumstances of Smith v. 
Maryland, new technologies, and changed circumstances. An end to the telephony 
metadata program and FISA reform are necessary to bring surveillance operations and 
emerging technologies within the bounds of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
